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Part I
Introduction and Background
1 Introduction
Kerberos [13, 17, 16, 18] is a widely deployed protocol, designed to repeatedly authenticate a client to multiple
application servers based on a single login. The protocol uses various credentials (tickets), encrypted under a server’s
key and thus opaque to the client, to authenticate the client to the server; this allows the client to obtain additional
credentials or to request service from an application server. A formalization of Kerberos 4, the first publicly released
version of this protocol, was given in [5] and has since been extended and thoroughly analyzed using an inductive
approach [1, 2, 3, 4]. This analysis, through heavy reliance on the Isabelle theorem prover, yielded formal correctness
proofs for a fairly detailed specification, and also highlighted a few minor problems. A simple fragment of the latest
version, Kerberos 5, has been investigated using the state exploration tool Murϕ [14]. This approach proved effective
for finding an attack, which the authors of [14] note is unrealizable in a full implementation of Kerberos 5, but came
short of proving positive correctness results.
Here we report on a project whose goal is to use the Multi-Set Rewriting (MSR) framework to give a precise
specification of Kerberos 5 at various levels of detail, ranging from a minimal account, similar to that used in [14], to a
detailed formalization of every behavior encompassed by this complex suite [13, 16]. Our particular objectives include
giving a precise and unambiguous description of this protocol, making its operational assumptions explicit, stating the
properties it is supposed to satisfy, and proving that it satisfies these properties. This will complement the currently
spotty and often vague information in the literature. This project is also intended as a test-bed for MSR on a real-world
protocol: we are interested in how easy it is to write large specifications in MSR, in what ways this language can be
improved, and whether the insight gained with toy protocols scales up. In this work we have also started exploring
forms of reasoning that best take advantage of the linguistic features of MSR.
In this paper we provide three formalizations of Kerberos 5, which we call our A, B, and C level formalizations.
The B and C level formalizations add detail to the A level formalization but are not otherwise related. The A level
formalization omits most timestamps and all optional features, including only what we believe is needed to provide
authentication. It is similar to the formalization of Kerberos 4 in [1, 2, 3], but without timestamps. This level of abstrac-
tion is a good starting point to utilize the proof techniques demonstrated within this paper, providing a formalization
which is not overly complicated (making proofs feasible), but which retains many properties of the full Kerberos 5
protocol. Our B level formalization adds some timestamps and temporal checks to our A level formalization, thus
closely paralleling the formalization of Kerberos 4 in [1, 2, 3]. We have not found any new and interesting properties
or anomalies related to the timestamps here; the two features of the B level which are not found in [1, 2, 3]—the
single option of mutual authentication and error messages—seemed like the most promising area to focus our efforts.
This leads to our C level formalization, which does not include temporal checks or most timestamps. It extends the A
level formalization by making mutual authentication optional and adding error messages, along with several low-level
aspects of the protocol, namely options, flags, and checksums, none of which has appeared in any previous study of
Kerberos. We have focused our investigations on the A and C level formalizations, with the abstraction of the for-
mer facilitating reasoning about the protocol and the detail of the latter providing an interesting step on the way to
formalizing the protocol in full detail.
We have proved confidentiality and authentication properties [11] for our A level formalization, and have extended
some of these proofs to our C level formalization; in each case, we use the notion of rank and corank functions,
inspired by [20]. While Kerberos specifically disclaims responsibility for preventing denial of service attacks, we have
noticed instances of other potentially curious protocol behavior. The first, which arises in both the A level and C level
formalizations, violates properties that were proved to hold for Kerberos 4 [1] and highlights the structural differences
between the messages in versions 4 and 5 of the protocol. The other three instances of curious behavior, seen only
in our C level formalization, take advantage of protocol options available at this level; the first and third of these are
related to the behavior also seen at the A level, while the second is completely unrelated. Our informal analysis of the
B level formalization did not reveal any new anomalies.
A shorter, preliminary report on this work appeared in [6]. This paper adds the B level formalization, analysis
of the C level Ticket-Granting Exchange and of the A level Client/Server Exchange, and some additional curious
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Figure 1: Expected message flow in Kerberos 5
protocol behavior. The A and C level formalizations have been updated in minor ways, as has our analysis of the A
level Ticket-Granting Exchange.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we give an overview of the Kerberos 5 protocol
and the MSR formalism. Our A level, C level, and B level formalizations are given in Sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
In Section 7 we discuss the curious protocol behavior that we have noted; in Section 8 we define the rank and corank
functions we use in our analysis of the protocol, and in Section 9 use these classes of functions to prove confidentiality
and authentication properties of Kerberos 5. The appendices provide details not included in the text, including the full
proofs of protocol properties, MSR traces showing the anomalies discussed here, and a comparison of the network
messages formalized here with the full messages specified by [16]
2 Overview of the Kerberos 5 Protocol
The Kerberos 5 protocol allows a client to repeatedly authenticate herself to multiple servers while minimizing the use
of the long-term secret key(s) shared between the client and the Kerberos infrastructure. The client starts by obtaining a
long-term credential, whose use requires her long term (shared) key, and then uses this to obtain short-term credentials
for particular servers. Assume that a client C wishes to authenticate herself to an application server S. A standard run
of Kerberos 5 which accomplishes this consists of three successive phases; the expected message flow in these phases
is shown in Figure 1 and proceeds as follows.
• In the first phase, C sends a KRB AS REQ message to the Kerberos Authentication Server (KAS) K requesting
a ticket granting ticket TGT for use with a particular Ticket Granting Server (TGS) T . K is expected to
reply with a KRB AS REP message consisting of the ticket TGT and an encrypted component containing a fresh
authentication key AKey to be shared between C and T . TGT contains AKey and is encrypted using the
secret key kT of T ; the accompanying message is encrypted under C’s secret key kC . Each of kC and kT is
shared between the named participant and a central key database from which it is accessible by K.
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• In the second phase, C forwards TGT , along with an authenticator encrypted under AKey, to the TGS T as
a KRB TGS REQ message; this requests a service ticket for use with the server S. T is expected to respond with
a KRB TGS REP message consisting of the service ticket ST and an encrypted component containing a fresh
service key SKey to be shared between C and S. ST contains SKey and is encrypted under S’s secret key
kS , which is shared between S and the central key database accessible by T ; the information for C, including
SKey, is encrypted under AKey.
• In the third phase, C forwards ST and a new authenticator encrypted with SKey in a KRB AP REQ message
to S. If all credentials are valid, this application server will authenticate C and provide the service. The
acknowledgment KRB AP REP message is optional.
A single ticket-granting ticket can be used to obtain several service tickets, possibly from several application servers,
while it is valid. Similarly, a single service ticket for the application server S can be used for repeated service from S
before it expires. In both cases, a fresh authenticator is required for each use of the ticket.
Note that the message flow is generally similar to that in Kerberos 4. However, Kerberos 5 includes a multitude of
options, some of which we formalize in Section 5, not available in the previous version of the protocol. Additionally,
the structure of the KRB AS REP and KRB TGS REP messages changed between versions 4 and 5 of the protocol.
In version 4 the ticket-granting ticket is sent by the KAS as part of the message encrypted under the client’s secret
key kC , and the service ticket sent by the TGS is likewise encrypted under the shared key AKey. In version 5, the
ticket-granting ticket and the service are sent without further encryption. This enables the cut and paste anomalies
which we describe in Section 7 and slightly weakens the properties which were proved for Kerberos 4.
As we formalize different aspects of Kerberos 5, we will modify Figure 1 to show how we represent these protocol
messages in MSR.
Finally, we note that the Kerberos 5 protocol has changed from its initial specification [13]; our work here is based
on version 10 [16] of the revisions to [13]. Among other things, this adds anonymous tickets (in which the client’s
name is replaced by a generic username) to the protocol. We discuss curious protocol behavior related to anonymous
tickets in Section 7.2; anonymous tickets may or may not be present in future revisions of Kerberos 5 [15], and have
been removed from the current version of the protocol description [18]. (The description of the protocol is an IETF
Internet Draft, each version of which has a six month lifetime.)
3 MSR
MSR originated as a simple logic-oriented language aimed at investigating the decidability of protocol analysis under a
variety of assumptions [9, 10]. It evolved into a precise, powerful, flexible, and still relatively simple framework for the
specification of complex cryptographic protocols, possibly structured as a collection of coordinated subprotocols [8];
its connections to other protocol analysis methods have been the subject of more recent work [7]. MSR uses strongly-
typed multiset rewriting rules over first-order atomic formulas to express protocol actions and relies on a form of
existential quantification to symbolically model the generation of fresh data (e.g., nonces or session keys). It supports
an array of useful static checks that include type-checking and data access verification. It has so far been applied to
toy protocols such as Needham-Schroeder and Neumann-Stubblebine [8]; one of the aims of this project is to evaluate
it on a real-world protocol. We will introduce the syntax and operations of MSR as we go along.
3.1 Signature
In order to specify a protocol in MSR, the protocol entities need to be classified and appropriately (sub)typed. The
signature fragment in Figure 2 sets up the typing infrastructure in the case of Kerberos 5, with the ‘Types’ column
summarizing the types used in this work. Italicized types (e.g., ts for TGS or server, and tcs for ts or client) are
auxiliary and serve the purpose of making precise the definitions of dbK and shK; a laxer definition could do without
them. The ‘Subtyping’ column expresses the subtyping relations satisfied by these types (τ <: τ ′ means that τ is a
subsort of τ ′), with indentation used as a visual aid to track dependencies. The declarations shown in black support
the A and B level formalizations (Sections 4 and 6) of this protocol, while the grayed-out additions are necessary for
the C level specification (Section 5).
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Types Subtyping Names
(Messages) msg : type. m,X, Y
(Principals) principal : type. principal <: msg.
KAS : type. KAS <: principal. K
tcs : type tcs <: principal.
ts : type ts <: tcs.
TGS : type. TGS <: ts. T
server : type. server <: ts. S
client : type. client <: tcs. C
(Encryption types) etype : type. etype <: msg. e
(Keys) key : etype→ type.
dbK : etype→ tcs → type. ∀e : etype,A : tcs. dbKe A <: keye. k
shK : etype→ client→ ts → type. ∀e : etype,C : client, A : ts. shKe C A <: keye. AKey
∀e : etype,C : client, A : ts. shKe C A <: msg. SKey
(Nonces) nonce : type. nonce <: msg. n
(Timestamps) time : type. time <: msg. t ,
(Options) Opt : type. Opt <: msg.
KOpt : type. KOpt <: Opt. KOpts
TOpt : type. TOpt <: Opt. TOpts
SOpt : type. SOpt <: Opt. SOpts
(Flags) Flag : type. Flag <: msg.
TFlag : type. TFlag <: Flag. TF lags
SFlag : type. SFlag <: Flag. SF lags
Figure 2: An MSR Signature for the A level and C level Specifications of Kerberos 5
Observe that shared keys (shK ) can be part of a message, but database keys (dbK ), i.e., keys shared between
tcs principals and the key database, cannot. Notice also that the encryption types (needed in the C level specification)
parameterize the various keys.
Additional declarations are needed to populate these types. In order to do so, we declare actual clients, servers,
database keys, etc. Conventional names for various meta-syntactic entities are given in the rightmost column of
Figure 2. For example, clients will typically called C. An underscore in a name will be appropriately instantiated in
the discussion: for example, kC will represent the database key of a client C and tC,Sreq will stand for a timestamp
included by C in a request to S.
The syntax of messages is shown in Figure 3. The first two declarations formalize concatenation and shared-key en-
cryption (with the encryption algorithm potentially depending on the encryption type). The third declaration captures
message digests as an implementation of cryptographic hashing; these are declared similarly to shared-key encryption.
We will generally keep the encryption type implicit unless we are specifically discussing it (as in Section 7.3).
(Pairing) , : msg→ msg→ msg.
(Encryption) { } : etype→ msg→ key → msg.
(Message digest) [ ] : etype→ msg→ key → msg.
Figure 3: Syntax for MSR messages.
3.2 States and roles
Intuitively, MSR represents the state of execution of a protocol as a multiset S of ground first-order formulas. Some
predicates are universal; in particular, N(m) indicates that message m is transiting through the network. Other predi-
cates are protocol-dependent and are classified as either memory or role state predicates. Memory predicates are used
to store information across several runs of a protocol, to pass data to subprotocols, and to invoke external modules.
The intruder I stores intercepted information m in the predicate I(m). We will encounter other memory predicates as
we go along. Role state predicates, usually written as L(. . .), allow sequentializing the actions of a principal.
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Principals cause local transformations to this global state S by non-deterministically executing multiset rewriting
rules of the form r = lhs −→ rhs , where lhs is a finite multiset of facts and constraints. These constraints, which are
not facts, are used by principals to, e.g., check system clocks or determine the validity of requests via external processes
not explicitly modelled here. Whenever the facts in lhs are contained in S and the constraints are all satisfied, rule r
can replace these facts with those from rhs . The actual definition is slightly more general in the sense that rules are
generally parametric and rhs may specify the generation of fresh data (e.g., nonces or session keys) before rewriting
the state.
The rules comprising a protocol or a subprotocol are collected in a role parameterized by the principal executing
it. Rules in a role are threaded through using role state predicates declared inside the role.
Part II
Formalizing Kerberos 5
4 A Level Formalization of Kerberos 5
Our A level formalization of Kerberos 5 has enough detail to prove authentication and confidentiality results (dis-
cussed in Section 9) but contains little else. The most notable omission is that of almost all timestamps; the sole one
included here prevents the KRB AP REP message from being the encryption of an empty message. Bella and Paulson’s
thorough analysis of Kerberos 4 included consideration of timestamps. The primary differences between Kerberos 4
and Kerberos 5 do not involve timestamps; as we have focused on the unanalyzed details of Kerberos 5, we have
omitted timestamps from this formalization of the protocol. However, a natural extension of our work thus far would
be a formalization and analysis of Kerberos 5 which includes all (or most) of the timestamps and temporal checks used
in this protocol. We leave this for future work.
Figure 4 updates Figure 1 to show how the different protocol messages are represented in this formalization of
Kerberos 5.
4.1 The Authentication Service Exchange
Figure 5 shows the client role for the Authentication Service Exchange. When C : client undertakes this role, she may
use rule α1.1 to send a KRB AS REQ message to any K : KAS requesting a ticket granting ticket for any T : TGS. In
this formalization, the KRB AS REQ message contains C’s name, T ’s name, and a freshly generated nonce n1. When
C sends the request, she also stores the information from the request (C, T , and n1) in a role state predicate L.
C expects the response from K to be composed of her name, an opaque message (intended to be the ticket granting
ticket), and another message encrypted under one of her database keys. This encrypted message is expected to contain
a key of type shK C T to be shared between C and T and used in the Ticket Granting Exchange, the nonce n1 from
C’s original request, and T ’s name. If a message of this form appears on the network (C uses the role state predicate
L to ensure that the nonce and the name of the TGS in this message match those in her original request), then C may
read this message from the network and save the relevant information. She does this using rule α1.2, which replaces
the facts N(C,X, {AKey, n1, T}kC ) and L(C, T, n1) with the fact AuthC(X,T,AKey), a memory predicate. C
thus saves the (presumed) ticket X , the name T of the TGS for whom the ticket was requested, and the key AKey to
be shared by C and T .
Figure 6 shows the role of the Kerberos Authentication Server for the Authentication Service Exchange. When-
ever a valid KRB AS REQ message appears on the network, any K : KAS may read that message from the network
and respond appropriately. The validity of the KRB AS REQ message is determined by some external process (incor-
porating local policy) modelled by the constraint V alidK(C, T, n1). K’s response involves generating a fresh key
AKey : shK C T to be shared by the client C and TGS T named in the KRB AS REQ message and then putting a
message, intended for C, on the network. This network message contains C’s name, the ticket granting ticket to be
included in C’s later request(s) to T , and data for C encrypted under one of her database keys. The ticket granting
ticket contains the key to be shared between T and C and C’s name, with these encrypted together using one of T ’s
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Client (C) KAS (K) TGS (T) Server (S)
• •-KRB AS REQ
• •ﬀ KRB AS REP
• •-KRB TGS REQ
• •ﬀ KRB TGS REP
• •-KRB AP REQ
• •ﬀ KRB AP REP
• •-Application messagesﬀ∗
∗
∗
KRB AS REQ : C, T, n1
KRB AS REP : C, {AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n1, T}kC
KRB TGS REQ : {AKey,C}kT , {C}AKey, C, S, n2
KRB TGS REP : C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n2, S}AKey
KRB AP REQ : {SKey,C}kS , {C, tC,Sreq}SKey
KRB AP REP : {tC,Sreq}SKey
- Normal messages
-ﬀ Application messages
Figure 4: Protocol messages in the abstract formalization
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∃L : client× TGS× nonce.
∀T : TGS .
∀K : KAS.
α1.1
−→
∃n1 : nonce
N(C, T, n1)
L(C, T, n1)
∀. . . .
∀kC : dbK C .
∀AKey : shK C T.
∀X : msg .
∀n1 : nonce .
N(C,X, {AKey, n1, T}kC )
L(C, T, n1)
α1.2
−→ AuthC(X,T,AKey)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 5: The client’s role in the A level Authentication Service Exchange.
0BBBBBBB@
∀C : client .
∀T : TGS .
∀n1 : nonce .
∀kC : dbK C .
∀kT : dbK T .
∀AKey : shK C T.
N(C, T, n1)
V alidK(C, T, n1)
α2.1
−→
∃AKey : shK C T
N(C, {AKey,C}kT ,{AKey, n1, T}kC )
1CCCCCCCA
∀K:KAS
Figure 6: The authentication server’s role in the A level Authentication Service Exchange.
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database keys. The encrypted data for C are AKey, the nonce from the request to which K is responding, and T ’s
name.
4.2 The Ticket-Granting Exchange
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∃L : client(C) × server × TGS(T ) × shK C T × nonce.
∀T : TGS .
∀S : server .
∀AKey : shK C T .
∀X : msg .
AuthC(X,T,AKey)
α3.1
−→
∃n2 : nonce
N(X, {C}AKey, C, S, n2)
AuthC(X,T,AKey)
L(C, S, T,AKey, n2)
∀. . . .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀Y : msg .
∀n2 : nonce .
N(C, Y,
{SKey, n2, S}AKey)
L(C, S, T,AKey, n2)
α3.2
−→ ServiceC(Y, S, SKey)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 7: The client’s role in the A level Ticket-Granting Exchange.
Figure 7 gives the client role for the Ticket-Granting Exchange. If a client C has successfully completed the Au-
thentication Service Exchange to get a ticket and key for T : TGS (as evidenced by the predicateAuthC(X,T,AKey)),
she may use rule α3.1 to send a KRB TGS REQ message to T . (This predicate does not guarantee that X is a ticket for
T , only that it was received in the Authentication Service Exchange in the place for the ticket.) In firing rule α3.1, C
generates a fresh nonce and puts a message on the network containing the presumed ticket X , an authenticator con-
sisting of her name encrypted under AKey, her name, the name of the server S for whom she wants a service ticket,
and the freshly generated nonce n2. This rule preserves the predicate AuthC since tickets may be used multiple times
(until they expire, which is not modelled here) and also creates a role state predicate L which contains information (C,
S, T , AKey, and n2) related to C’s KRB TGS REQ message.
C expects the response from T to contain her name, and opaque message (intended to be the service ticket), and
additional data encrypted under the key AKey which is shared between C and T . These data are a key to be shared
between C and the server S for whom C has requested credentials, the nonce n2 from C’s request to T , and S’s name.
If a message of this form appears on the network, C may use rule α3.2 to process it; as in the Authentication Service
Exchange, C uses the role state predicate to ensure that the proper nonce is included in the response she receives. This
rule consumes the network message and role state predicate and stores the (presumed) service ticket, server name, and
new shared key in the memory predicate ServiceC .0BBBBBBB@
∀C : client .
∀S : server .
∀AKey : shK C T .
∀kT : dbK T .
∀kS : dbK S .
∀n2 : nonce .
N({AKey,C}kT ,{C}AKey, C, S, n2)
V alidT (C, S, n2)
α4.1
−→
∃SKey : shK C S
N(C, {SKey,C}kS ,{SKey, n2, S}AKey)
1CCCCCCCA
∀T :TGS
Figure 8: The ticket granting server’s role in the A level Ticket Granting Exchange.
Figure 8 contains the TGS role in the Ticket-Granting Exchange. When a valid KRB TGS REQ message appears
on the network, the TGS T whose database key is used to encrypt the ticket in this message may process the request.
As in the Authentication Service Exchange, the validity of the request is checked by an external process which is
modelled here as the constraint V alidT . T may process a valid request message by firing rule α4.1, which consumes
the network message fact, generates a fresh key to be shared by the client C and server S named in the request, and
puts a message intended for C on the network. This message contains C’s name, a service ticket to be passed on to
S, and data for C encrypted under the key AKey which was included in the ticket-granting ticket and used by C to
encrypt the authenticator in the KRB TGS REQ message. The service ticket is encrypted under one of S’s database
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keys and contains the freshly generated key SKey and C’s name. The data encrypted for C are the freshly generated
key, the nonce from the KRB TGS REQ request to which T is responding, and the S’s name.
4.3 The Client/Server Exchange
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∃L : client(C) × server(S) × shK C S × time×msg.
∀S : server .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀tC,Sreq : time .
∀Y : msg .
ServiceC(Y, S, SKey)
ClockC(tC,Sreq)
α5.1
−→
N(Y, {C, tC,Sreq}SKey)
ServiceC(Y, S, SKey)
L(C, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y )
∀. . .. N({tC,Sreq}SKey)
L(C, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y )
α5.2
−→ DoneMutC(S, SKey)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 9: The client’s role in the A level Client/Server Exchange (with mutual authentication).
Figure 9 contains the client role for the Client/Server Exchange. Once the client C has obtained a (presumed)
service ticket and key for the server S via the Ticket-Granting Exchange (storing these in the memory predicate
ServiceC), she may use the rule α5.1 to request service from S. In addition to the predicate ServiceC(Y, S, SKey),
which stores the data from the ticket-granting exchange, the left side of this rule also contains the constraintClockC(tC,Sreq).
This is satisfied if and only if C’s local time is tC,Sreq : time. The firing of rule α5.1 puts a KRB AP REQ message
on the network; this consists of the message Y from the ServiceC predicate, presumed to be a service ticket for S,
and an authenticator. The authenticator is C’s name and her current time encrypted together using the key SKey
which was stored with Y in ServiceC . This rule preserves the ServiceC predicate for future reuse and also creates
a role state predicate containing information about the request. Although not explicitly shown in this formalization,
we assume that C requests mutual authentication from the server S; our detailed formalization below allows for C to
specify whether or not S should respond.
C expects S to respond by sending a message consisting of tC,Sreq encrypted by the key SKey, shared by C and
S, which C used to encrypt the authenticator in the KRB AP REQ message. If she sees a message of this form on the
network (and has sent the matching initial request as indicated by the role state predicate L), C may use rule α5.2 to
read this KRB AP REP message from the network. She then stores the server’s name and the shared key SKey in
the DoneMutC memory predicate (indicating that the protocol has finished with mutual authentication used). The
DoneMutC predicate and key SKey would be used by C in additional interactions with S (such as sending messages
related to network services provided by S) after authentication has been completed; as this is outside of the Kerberos
protocol, we do not formalize it here.0BBB@
∀C : client .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀tC,Sreq : time .
∀kS : dbK S .
N({SKey,C}kS ,{C, tC,Sreq}SKey)
V alidS(C, tC,Sreq)
α6.1
−→
N({tC,Sreq}SKey)
MemS(C, SKey, tC,Sreq)
1CCCA
∀S:server
Figure 10: The end server’s role in the A level Client/Server Exchange (with mutual authentication).
The server’s role in this exchange is shown in Figure 10. If the network contains a valid KRB AP REQ message
intended for S (the ticket is encrypted using one of his database keys), then he may process it using rule α6.1. As for
the other request messages, the validity of the KRB AP REQ message is determined by an external process which we
formalize as the constraint V alidS(C, tC,Sreq). This rule puts a KRB AP REP message on the network; this consists
of the timestamp tC,Sreq from the request being processed encrypted by the shared key SKey included in the service
ticket. S also stores the relevant information about this request and his response, namely the client’s name, the shared
key, and the time of the request, in the memory predicate MemS . This is analogous to C’s predicate DoneMut in
that this information may be used after authentication is completed but is not part of the protocol itself and thus not
used in our formalizations.
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4.4 A level intruder formalization
In this section, we present the rules specifying the Dolev-Yao intruder model for Kerberos 5.
We divide the actions available to the intruder into three categories:
• the fairly standard operations of interception/transmission of a network message, decomposition/composition of
a pair, and decryption/encryption of a message given a known key (Section 4.4.1);
• the often overlooked action of generating new data (Section 4.4.2);
• and the use of accessible data (Section 4.4.3).
4.4.1 Network, pairing and encryption rules
We present the following pairs of rules describing how the Dolev-Yao intruder can work with data on the network or
in her possession; the rules in each pair are symmetric (e.g., encryption and decryption) operations.
The intruder may intercept network messages (INT), removing them from the network, and transmit messages she
knows (TRN): (
∀m : msg. N(m) INT−→ I(m)
)I (
∀m : msg. I(m) TRN−→ N(m)
)I
The intruder may decompose (DMC) and compose (CMP) compound messages:(
∀m1,m2 : msg. I(m1,m2) DMC−→ I(m1)I(m2)
)I (
∀m1,m2 : msg. I(m1)I(m2)
CMP−→ I(m1,m2)
)I
If the intruder knows a shared key, she may decrypt (SDC′) and encrypt (SEC′) messages using this key:
∀C : client .
∀A : TS .
∀k : shK C A.
∀m : msg .
I({m}k)
I(k)
SDC’−→ I(m)

I 
∀C : client .
∀A : TS .
∀k : shK C A.
∀m : msg .
I(m)
I(k)
SEC’−→ I({m}k)

I
If the intruder knows a database key, she may decrypt (DDC′) and encrypt (DEC′) messages using this key:∀A : TCS .∀k : dbK A.
∀m : msg .
I({m}k)
I(k)
DDC’−→ I(m)
I ∀A : TCS .∀k : dbK A.
∀m : msg .
I(m)
I(k)
DEC’−→ I({m}k)
I
Finally, the intruder may duplicate (DPM and DPD) and delete (DLM and DLD) any of the data (messages or
database keys) that she knows; the deletion rules can be safely omitted from the specification.(
∀m : msg. I(m) DPM−→ I(m)
I(m)
)I (
∀m : msg. I(m) DLM−→ ·
)I
(∀A : TCS .
∀kA : dbK A. I(kA)
DPD−→ I(kA)
I(kA)
)I (∀A : TCS .
∀kA : dbK A. I(kA)
DLD−→ ·
)I
4.4.2 Data generation rules
In general, the intruder should be able to generate everything an honest principal can generate, often nonces and
session keys but nothing else. In the case of Kerberos, we must admit an exception to this rule: because principals
forward uninterpreted data, we must also allow the intruder to create garbage, modelled as objects of the generic type
msg.
The intruder may generate fresh nonces (NG), session keys (KG′), and generic messages (MG) using the following
rules: (
· NG−→ ∃n : nonce I(n)
)I
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(∀C : client.
∀A : TS . ·
KG’−→ ∃k : shK C A I(k)
)I
(
· MG−→ ∃m : msg I(m)
)I
The intruder is not allowed to generate any other kind of data—principal names of any kind (the introduction of new
agents happens out-of-band), long-term keys (they are distributed out-of-band), or timestamps (they are generated by
an external clock, not by any principal)—as that would open the door to countless false attacks. Note that MG does
not allow the generation of database keys (which are not subtypes of msg), nor does it generate terms which may be
typed as anything other than msg. In particular, the messages freshly generated by MG are not the encryption of any
other messages; in Section 8, we restate this in terms of the rank functions defined there as Axiom 1.
4.4.3 Data access rules
The intruder is entitled to look up the same data that any other principal may; she may store these data in the I( )
predicate for later use.
The intruder has access to the name of any principal (client, server, TGS, or KAS):(
∀A : principal. · PA−→ I(A)
)I
The intruder also has access to any defined timestamp. As timestamps are guessable, they are thus qualitatively
different from nonces here. We note that this may provide the intruder with more power than she would reasonably
have. (
∀t : time. · TA−→ I(t)
)I
The intruder is entitled to lookup any session key she owns. This is modelled by the following two slightly
asymmetric rules. (∀A : TS .
∀k : shK IA. ·
SA1’−→ I(k)
)I
(∀C : client .
∀k : shK C I. ·
SA2’−→ I(k)
)I
It should be possible to prove that these rules are redundant since the intruder, like any other principal, is handed her
session keys by the KAS or the TGS; these rules could then be eliminated.
Finally, the intruder may access any of her long-term (database) keys:(
∀k : dbK I. · DA’−→ I(k)
)I
5 C Level Formalization of Kerberos 5
Our C level formalization is closer to the full Kerberos 5 specification than is our A level formalization in Section 4.
Figure 11 updates Figure 1 to show the protocol messages in the C level formalization, with those details not in the A
level formalization shown here in gray type.
In this formalization we extend the A level formalization by adding the message field which allows a client to
request various options (including ANONYMOUS tickets where implemented) from a TGS as well as the message field
(of type etype) which the client uses to request particular encryption method(s); we note curious behavior involving
these details of the protocol in Section 7. We now include message digests as specified by Kerberos 5; one topic for
further work is their utility in defending against the anomalous behavior discussed in Section 7. Here we add the
message field (of type SOpt) which allows C to specify whether a KRB AP REP response from S is requested and
have also incorporated error messages. These will allow investigation of protocol runs which would not appear in the
previous analyses of Kerberos. Although we do not make use of it, we have also added the option field of type KOpt
to parallel those of types TOpt and SOpt and various flag fields corresponding to the option fields already discussed.
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Client (C) KAS (K) TGS (T) Server (S)
• •-KRB AS REQ
• •ﬀ KRB AS REP• •ﬀ
KRB ERROR− AS
• •-KRB TGS REQ
• •ﬀ KRB TGS REP• •ﬀ
KRB ERROR− TGS
• •-KRB AP REQ
• •ﬀ
[KRB AP REP]
• •ﬀ
KRB ERROR− AP
• •-Application messagesﬀ∗
∗
∗
KRB AS REQ : KOpts,C, T, n1, e
KRB AS REP : C,TGT, {AKey, n1, TF lags,T}ekC
KRB TGS REQ : TGT, {C,MD , tC,Treq}AKey , TOpts,C, S, n2, e
KRB TGS REP : C, ST, {SKey, n2, SF lags,S}eAKey
KRB AP REQ : SOpts,ST, {C,MD ′,tC,Sreq}SKey
KRB AP REP : {tC,Sreq}SKey
KRB ERROR−X : KRB ERROR, [−|tC,Treq|tC,Sreq], t(K|T |S),err, ErrCode, C, (K|T |S)
TGT = {TF lags,AKey,C}kT
ST = {SF lags,SKey, C}kS
MD = [TOpts, C, S, n2, e]AKey
MD ′ = [. . .]SKey
- Normal messages
- Error messages
-ﬀ Application messages
Figure 11: Protocol messages in the C level formalization
The C level formalization allows the various servers to send error messages in response to requests. In order
to associate error messages with the corresponding requests, the authenticators sent to T and S now include the
timestamps tC,Treq and tC,Sreq; we have not, however, added any temporal checks involving these timestamps. Note
that error messages are completely unencrypted and do not contain any information which was originally sent in
encrypted form. These can be generated at will by the intruder.
Figures 12–19 give the non-intruder roles in the C level formalization. The gray text indicates detail which appears
here but not in the A level formalization. Figures 18 and 19 are entirely gray as these roles are used only when a client
does not request mutual authentication from a server, a protocol option not included in the A level formalization. The
rule corresponding to rule αi.j in the A level formalization is denoted by γi.j ; alternative rules are indicated by priming
j (e.g., for error handling) or i (for the Client/Server Exchange without mutual authentication).
While fields specifying encryption type appear in several messages in this level, and should technically appear for
every encrypted message that occurs (following to Section 3), we explicitly include these only in the Authentication
Service Exchange rules (Section 5.1) unless we are discussing encryption types in particular (as in Section 7.3).
5.1 The Authentication Service Exchange
Figure 12 shows the client role for the Authentication Service Exchange in our detailed formalization. Rule γ1.1 allows
the client C to initiate the authentication process by sending a message to a KASK. This extends Rule α1.1 by adding
fields for options (KOpts) and encryption type (e) to both the request message placed on the network and the role
state predicate L.
Rule γ1.2 parallels rule α1.2 and allows C to process the expected response from K. In addition to accounting for
KOpts and e from the original request, this rule also accepts and stores the field TF lags which describes the options
actually granted by K (which may or may not match those requested by C).
14
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∃L : client× KOpt×TGS× nonce×etype.
∀T : TGS .
∀K : KAS .
∀KOpts : KOpt.
∀e : etype .
γ1.1
−→
∃n1 : nonce
N(KOpts,C, T, n1, e)
L(C,KOpts,T, n1, e)
∀. . . .
∀kC : dbK C .
∀AKey : shK C T.
∀X : msg .
∀e′ : etype .
∀n1 : nonce .
∀TF lags : TFlag .
N(C,X, {AKey,
n1, TF lags,T}e′kC )
L(C,KOpts,T, n1, e)
γ1.2
−→
AuthC(X,TF lags,
T,AKey)
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
∀tK,err : time .
N(KRB ERROR, tK,err,
ErrorCode, C,K)
L(C,KOpts, T, n1, e)
γ1.2′
−→
ASErrorC(KRB ERROR,
tK,err, ErrorCode,K)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 12: The client’s role in the C level Authentication Service Exchange.
Finally, rule γ1.2′ allows C to process generic error messages returned; this has no analogue in the A level formal-
ization. If C has an AS request pending (as evidenced by the existence of the role state predicate L) and she sees an
error message on the network which includes her name, then she may read the error message from the network and
store the information contained in it in the memory predicate ASError (which is new in this formalization). We do
not currently use the ASError predicate beyond this, but it might be used to allow more extensive error processing
by the client. Note that the nonce n1 is not returned in the error message; if C has multiple requests pending with a
KASK, each with its own nonce, there is no way for C to associate the error message with the request that generated
the error.
Figure 13 shows the authentication server’s role in the detailed formalization of the Authentication Service Ex-
change. Rule γ2.1 parallels rule α2.1, adding details which allow the processing of the requested options KOpts (the
options actually granted are described in TF lags) and encryption type e. The constraint V alidK incorporates the
additional details KOpts and e added to the request. We use constraint SetAuthF lagsK to implement K’s granting
of options in the ticket-granting ticket; we allow these to depend on the requested options and the names of the princi-
pals who will share the key generated by this rule. Like V alidK , SetAuthF lags may depend on local policy and is
not explicitly described in the formalization. The constraint SetETypesK implements K’s policies for selecting an
encryption type e′ for the data for C (taking into account her requested encryption type(s) e) and an encryption type
e′′ for the ticket for T .0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∀C : client .
∀T : TGS .
∀n1 : nonce .
∀e, e′, e′′ : etype .
∀kC : dbKe
′
C .
∀kT : dbKe
′′
T .
∀AKey : shK C T .
∀KOpts : KOpt .
∀TF lags : TFlag .
N(KOpts,C, T, n1, e)
V alidK(KOpts,C, T, n1, e)
SetAuthF lagsK(KOpts, C, T, TF lags)
SetETypesK(C, e, e
′, T, e′′)
γ2.1
−→
∃AKey : shK C T
N(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}e′′kT ,
{AKey, n1, TF lags,T}e′kC )
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
∀tK,err : time .
N(KOpts, C, T, n1, e)
InvalidK(KOpts, C, T, n1, e)
ClockK(tK,err)
γ2.1′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tK,err,
ErrorCode, C,K)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀K:KAS
Figure 13: The authentication server’s role in the C level Authentication Service Exchange.
Rule γ2.1′ allows the KAS K to send an error message in response to an invalid message request. The invalidity
of a request is determined by the constraint InvalidK , which is not defined in the formalization but which is assumed
to hold when the request is invalid for the reason given by the error code ErrorCode. (If there are multiple reasons
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why a request is invalid, we assume that InvalidK conforms to implementation-specific rules about which error code
to return.) Rule γ2.1′ also makes use of the constraint ClockK to generate a timestamp for the error message; as for
ClockC in rule α5.1, this constraint is satisfied exactly when its argument matches K’s local time.
5.2 The Ticket-Granting Exchange
Figure 14 shows the C level client role in the Ticket-Granting Exchange. The client C now includes a timestamp
tC,Treq in her request to the TGS T , which she places on the network using rule γ3.1. She uses TOpts to specify
the options she would like set on the new ticket, possibly including the request for an ANONYMOUS ticket if this
option has been implemented as in [16]. C also uses the key AKey which she shares with T to construct a keyed
checksum [TOpts, C, S, n2, e]AKey; following the protocol specification, the checksum is not included in the data (the
KRB-REQ-BODY part of the message) over which the checksum is taken. The role state predicate has been expanded
from the A level version to store the additional information from her request in this formalization, namely TOpts,
tC,Treq , and e.0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∃L : client(C) × TOpt×server × TGS(T ) × shK C T × nonce×time.
∀T : TGS .
∀S : server .
∀AKey : shK C T.
∀X : msg .
∀tC,Treq : time .
∀TF lags : TFlag .
∀TOpts : TOpt .
∀e : etype .
AuthC(X,TF lags,T,AKey)
ClockC(tC,Treq)
γ3.1
−→
∃n2 : nonce
N(X, {C, [TOpts, C, S, n2, e]AKey,
tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts,C, S, n2, e)
AuthC(X,TF lags,T,AKey)
L(C, TOpts,S, T,
AKey, n2, tC,Treq, e)
∀. . . .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀Y : msg .
∀n2 : nonce .
∀SF lags : SFlag .
N(C, Y,
{SKey, n2, SF lags,S}AKey)
L(C, TOpts,S, T,
AKey, n2, tC,Treq, e)
γ3.2
−→
ServiceC(Y, SF lags,
S, SKey)
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
∀tT,err : time .
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Treq, tT,err,
ErrorCode, C, T )
L(C, TOpts, S, T,
AKey, n2, tC,Treq, e)
γ3.2′
−→ TGSErrorC(T, tT,err, ErrorCode)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 14: The client’s role in the C level Ticket-Granting Exchange.
Rule γ3.2 parallels rule α3.2, adding the SF lags field in the expected response from T (this indicates which
options were actually granted on the ticket created by T ) and extending the memory predicate Service to store this
information.
The client C processes error messages from T using rule γ3.2′ . As formalized here, the processing of these
messages consists only of reading them from the network, deleting the role state predicate associated with the original
request, and storing data about the error in the memory predicate TGSError. An extension of this formalization
might make further use of this predicate to allow a more nuanced response by C to error messages.
Figure 15 shows the TGS role in the Ticket-Granting Exchange. Rule γ4.1 allows the TGS T to process a valid
request in the C level formalization from a client C, including the new message fields discussed for the client role.
We also add the SetServF lagsT constraint, which implements T ’s policies in granting options in response to those
requested by C via the TOpts field; here, we allow the granted options to depend upon the properties of the ticket-
granting ticket (TF lags) as well as the principals C and S who will share the new key generated by this rule. Another
constraint verifies the keyed checksum included in the request.
Rule γ4.1′ allows T to generate an error message in response to an invalid request for a service ticket. The InvalidT
constraint ensures that an appropriate error code is included in this message; note that InvalidT has sufficient infor-
mation to determine whether the checksum included in the request message is correct. The ClockT constraint is used,
as elsewhere, to obtain the local time.
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∀C : client .
∀S : server .
∀AKey : shK C T .
∀kT : dbK T .
∀kS : dbK S .
∀n2 : nonce .
∀tC,Treq : time .
∀TOpts : TOpt .
∀e : etype .
∀SF lags : SFlag .
∀ck : msg .
∀TF lags : TFlag .
N({TF lags,AKey,C}kT ,{C, ck, tC,Treq}AKey,
TOpts,C, S, n2, e)
V alidT (TOpts,C, S, n2, e, tC,Treq)
SetServF lagsT (TOpts, TF lags, C, S, SF lags)
ck = [TOpts, C, S, n2, e]AKey
γ4.1
−→
∃SKey : shK C S
N(C, {SF lags,SKey,C}kS ,{SKey, n2, SF lags,S}AKey)
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
∀tT,err : time .
N({TF lags,AKey,C}kT ,{C, ck, tC,Treq}AKey,
TOpts, C, S, n2, e)
InvalidT (TOpts, C, S, n2,
e, tC,Treq , ck)
ClockT (tT,err)
γ4.1′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Treq, tT,err,
ErrorCode, C, T )
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀T :TGS
Figure 15: The ticket granting server’s role in the C level Ticket Granting Exchange.
5.3 The Client/Server Exchange
Figure 16 shows the client role for the Client/Server Exchange when the client C would like mutual authentication
from the server S. Rule γ5.1 parallels rule α5.1, adding a few new details. The SOpts field allows C to request
particular behavior on the part of S and is now stored in the role state predicate L. One of the options controlled by
SOpts is mutual authentication (a reply from S in response to a valid request from C). If this option is requested, the
constraint Mutual(SOpts) holds. We assume that this is the case here, and treat the other case separately below. The
network message generated by C now also includes a keyed checksum. Since the contents of this are not specified
by [13], we leave this as [. . .]SKey here. If the properties of a checksum over a particular set of data are of interest,
this can be specified in the formalization.
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∃L : client(C) × SOpt×server(S) × shK C S × time×msg.
∀S : server .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀tC,Sreq : time .
∀Y : msg .
∀SF lags : SFlag .
∀SOpts : SOpt .
ServiceC(Y, SF lags,S, SKey)
Mutual(SOpts)
ClockC(tC,Sreq)
γ5.1
−→
N(SOpts,Y, {C, [. . .]SKey,tC,Sreq}SKey)
ServiceC(Y, SF lags,S, SKey)
L(C, SOpts,S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y )
∀. . .. N({tC,Sreq}SKey)
L(C, SOpts,S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y )
γ5.2
−→ DoneMutC(S, SKey)
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
∀tS,err : time .
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq,
tS,err, ErrorCode, C, S)
L(C, SOpts, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y )
γ5.2′
−→ APErrorC(S, tS,err, ErrorCode)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 16: The client’s role in the C level Client/Server Exchange with mutual authentication.
Rule γ5.2 allows C to process a message whose form matches that of the expected response from S; this extends
rule α5.2 to treat the addition of SOpts. Rule γ5.2′ allows C to process an error message from S. As with error
messages in the other exchanges, this deletes the relevant role state predicate and stores the currently unused error
information in a memory predicate (here APError).
Figure 17 shows the server role for processing requests which require mutual authentication. If the network
message is a valid request, the server S uses rule γ6.1 to process it. The network message now includes the SF lags
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field in the ticket and other fields described under the client’s role. As for the client’s role, we use the constraint
Mutual to ensure that mutual authentication has been requested (the case where it is not is treated below). The
V alidS constraint has been extended to the new fields of the message. S also verifies the keyed checksum; as noted
above, the data over which this is taken is unspecified by both the protocol and our formalization.0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∀C : client .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀tC,Sreq : time .
∀kS : dbK S .
∀ck : msg .
∀SOpts : SOpt .
∀SF lags : SFlag .
N(SOpts,{SF lags,SKey,C}kS ,{C, ck,tC,Sreq}SKey)
Mutual(SOpts)
V alidS(C, SOpts, SF lags,tC,Sreq)
ck = [. . .]SKey
γ6.1
−→
N({tC,Sreq}SKey)
MemS(C, SKey, tC,Sreq)
∀. . . .
∀ErrCode : msg.
∀tS,err : time .
N(SOpts, {SF lags, SKey,C}kS ,{C, ck, tC,Sreq}SKey)
Mutual(SOpts)
InvalidS(C, SOpts,
SF lags, SKey, tC,Sreq, ck)
ClockS(tS,err)
γ6.1′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq,
tS,err, ErrCode, C, S)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀S:server
Figure 17: The end server’s role in the C level Client/Server Exchange with mutual authentication.
Rule γ6.1′ allows S to respond to an invalid request appearing on the network. The invalidity is determined by the
InvalidS constraint; this includes the possibility of an incorrect checksum. S uses the ClockS constraint to obtain
the correct timestamp for the error message and places this message on the network.
5.4 The Client/Server Exchange without mutual authentication
The rules for the Client/Server Exchange when mutual authentication is not requested have the same level of detail as
the rules for requests involving mutual authentication. The differences are solely to complete the exchange after the
client’s message to the server without having the client wait for a response.
Figure 18 gives the client role for the Client/Server Exchange when the client C does not request mutual authen-
tication. Rule γ5′.1 differs from rule γ5.1 only in that SOpts is not set for mutual authentication (thus satisfying the
NoMutual constraint) and C’s use of the DoneNoMut predicate to store information about her request; as with the
DoneMut predicate, this formalization does not make further use of this data. C does keep the role state predicate in
order to tie the processing of error messages to the original request.
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∃L : client(C) × SOpt× server(S) × shK C S × time×msg.
∀S : server .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀tC,Sreq : time .
∀Y : msg .
∀SF lags : SFlag .
∀SOpts : SOpt .
ServiceC(Y, SF lags, S, SKey)
NoMutual(SOpts)
ClockC(tC,Sreq)
γ5′.1
−→
N(SOpts, Y, {C, [. . .]SKey, tC,Sreq}SKey)
ServiceC(Y, SF lags, S, SKey, )
L(C, SOpts, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y )
DoneNoMutC(S, SKey)
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
∀tS,err : time .
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq,
tS,err, ErrorCode, C, S)
L(C, SOpts, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y )
γ5′.2′
−→
APErrorC(S, tS,err,
ErrorCode)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 18: The client’s role in the C level Client/Server Exchange without mutual authentication.
Figure 19 gives the corresponding server role. As for the client, the Mutual constraint is replaced by the
NoMutual constraint. When processing a valid request using rule γ6′.1, the server S does not produce a network
message, but still creates the memory predicate Mem. Error messages are as in the mutual authentication case.
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∀C : client .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀tC,Sreq : time .
∀kS : dbK S .
∀ck : msg .
∀SOpts : SOpt .
∀SF lags : SFlag .
N(SOpts, {SF lags, SKey, C}kS ,{C, ck, tC,Sreq}SKey)
NoMutual(SOpts)
V alidS(C, SOpts, SF lags, tC,Sreq)
ck = [. . .]SKey
γ6′.1
−→ MemS(C, SKey, tC,Sreq)
∀. . . .
∀ErrCode : msg.
∀tS,err : time .
N(SOpts, {SF lags, SKey, C}kS ,{C, ck, tC,Sreq}SKey)
NoMutual(SOpts)
InvalidS(C, SOpts,
SF lags, SKey, tC,Sreq, ck)
ClockS(tS,err)
γ6′.1′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq,
tS,err, ErrCode, C, S)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀S:server
Figure 19: The end server’s role in the C level Client/Server Exchange without mutual authentication.
5.5 C level intruder formalization
The admissible Dolev-Yao intruder actions are updated to reflect the added detail in the C level principal roles and
additions to the syntax of the MSR specification.
The intruder rules for interception/transmission, decomposition/composition, and decryption/encryption with a
known key change only to the extent that we must take encryption types into account in the rules that involve crypto-
graphic primitives. The necessary extensions to the network, pairing, and encryption rules are as follows.
∀C : client .
∀A : TS .
∀e : etype .
∀k : shKe C A.
∀m : msg .
I({m}ek)
I(k)
SDC’−→ I(m)

I 
∀C : client .
∀A : TS .
∀e : etype .
∀k : shKe C A.
∀m : msg .
I(m)
I(k)
SEC’−→ I({m}ek)

I

∀A : TCS .
∀e : etype .
∀k : dbKe A.
∀m : msg .
I({m}ek)
I(k)
DDC’−→ I(m)

I 
∀A : TCS .
∀e : etype .
∀k : dbKe A.
∀m : msg .
I(m)
I(k)
DEC’−→ I({m}ek)

I
∀A : TCS .∀e : etype .
∀kA : dbKe A.
I(kA)
DPD−→ I(kA)
I(kA)
I ∀A : TCS .∀e : etype .
∀kA : dbKe A.
I(kA)
DLD−→ ·
I
We need to update the data generation rule KG’ as follows.∀C : client.∀A : TS .
∀e : etype .
· KG’−→ ∃k : shKe C A I(k)
I
The data access rules need to be updated as follows.∀A : TS .∀e : etype .
∀k : shKe IA.
· SA1’−→ I(k)
I ∀C : client .∀e : etype .
∀k : shKe C I.
· SA2’−→ I(k)
I (∀e : etype .∀k : dbKe I. · DA’−→ I(k)
)I
The C level intruder also makes use of rules which do not extend rules of the A level intruder. Here the intruder can
construct a message digest as long as she knows the proper key. However, there is no disassembling rule for message
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digests since (cryptographic) hashing does not permit recovering a message.
∀C : client .
∀A : TS .
∀e : etype .
∀k : shKe C A.
∀m : msg .
I(m)
I(k)
MD−→ I([m]ek)

I
The updates to the generation rules are limited to allowing the intruder to choose the encryption type of any session
key she may generate. None of the new data types introduced at this level of detail can be generated by the intruder (or
any other principal). Therefore there are no additional data generation rules beyond those we presented in Section 4.4.
Data access rules are subject to similar changes. However, we treat the new data types, encryption types, options
and flags, similarly to timestamps: each of them range over a limited number of legal values, each being public
knowledge. As for timestamps, these rules make encryption types, options and flags guessable.(
∀e : etype. · EA−→ I(e)
)I
(
∀o : Opt. · OA−→ I(o)
)I
(
∀f : Flag. · FA−→ I(f)
)I
Observe that, by virtue of subtyping, the last two inference figures apply to each of the subsorts of Opt and Flag.
Other information that was inaccessible in the A level specification of the intruder remains inaccessible.
6 B Level Protocol Formalization
Our B level formalization extends our A level formalization by adding different details than we use in our C level
formalization. Figure 20 updates Figure 1 to show the protocol messages in the B level formalization, with those
details not in the A level formalization shown here in gray type.
The primary new detail here is the addition of timestamps and other time data to the protocol messages. As in our C
level formalization, we also make mutual authentication by the end server optional and add error messages (following
the full protocol specification, these are again unencrypted).
The MSR signature of the B level formalization is the same as for the A level formalization; the B level intruder
rules are unchanged from those for the A level.
6.1 The Authentication Service Exchange
The client’s actions in Authentication Service Exchange are formalized in Figure 21. Rule β1.1 allows C to initiate the
Authentication Service Exchange with some K : KAS; this leaves the corresponding A level rule (α1.1) unmodified.
Rule β1.2 allows C to process a KRB AS REP message naming her and including the nonce she previously sent to
K. This formalization adds two time data to the KRB AS REP message; these are discussed in connection with K’s
rule β2.1. As in the A level formalization, C uses the AuthC predicate to save information about this exchange (here
also including the two time fields) for future use.
If C has an AS request pending, indicated by the role state predicate L, and an error message containing her
name appears on the network, then she may use rule β1.2′ to process the message. In doing so, C stores the relevant
information in the ASErrorC memory predicate. Here an error message consists of the message type (KRB ERROR),
time that the error occurred (tK,err), description of the error (ErrorCode), and the names of the client and KAS
involved.
The role of the KAS in this exchange is shown in Figure 22. Rule β2.1 allows K to process a valid KRB AS REQ
message. As in the A level formalization, the validity of this message is determined by the V alidK external pro-
cess. If the request is valid, K reads the current time from his local clock via the ClockK constraint, uses the
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Client KAS TGS Server
• •-KRB AS REQ
• •ﬀ KRB AS REP• •ﬀ
KRB ERROR− AS
• •-KRB TGS REQ
• •ﬀ KRB TGS REP• •ﬀ
KRB ERROR− TGS
• •-KRB AP REQ
• •.....................................................................ﬀ (KRB AP REP)• •ﬀ
KRB ERROR− AP
• •-Application messagesﬀ∗
∗
∗
KRB AS REQ : C, T, n1
KRB AS REP : C, {AKey,C, tK,auth, tK,end}kT , {AKey, n1, tK,auth, tK,end,T}kC
KRB TGS REQ : {AKey,C, tK,auth, tK,end}kT , {C, tC,Treq}AKey, C, S, n2
KRB TGS REP : C, {SKey,C, tT,auth, tT,end}kS , {SKey, n2, tT,auth, tT,end,S}AKey
KRB AP REQ : MUTUAL?,{SKey,C, tT,auth, tT,end}kS , {C, tC,Sreq}SKey
KRB AP REP : {tC,Sreq}SKey
KRB ERROR−(AS|TGS|AP) : KRB ERROR, [−|tC,Treq|tC,Sreq], t(K|T |S),err, ErrCode, C, (K|T |S)
- Normal messages
. . . .- Optional messages
- Error messages
-ﬀ Application messages
Figure 20: Kerberos 5 Messages in the B level Formalization
ATicketExp constraint to determine an appropriate ticket expiration time (tK,end), and sends a KRB AS REP mes-
sage which extends the A level version by adding these two time values. Rule β2.1′ formalizes K’s response to an
invalid KRB AS REQ (as determined by the InvalidK constraint); this error message also includes K’s current local
time.
6.2 The Ticket-Granting Exchange
The client’s role in the Ticket-Granting Exchange is shown in Figure 23. Rule β3.1 extends rule α3.1 so that C now
includes a timestamp (the value of her local clock) in the authenticator she sends to the TGS; the predicate AuthC is
extended as discussed under rule β1.2, and the role state predicate L now stores the timestamp added in the B level.
Rule β3.2 updates rule α3.2 to store the two new time values in the KRB TGS REP message in the predicate ServiceC .
Rules β3.2′ and β3.2′′ allow C to handle error messages that appear to relate to a KRB TGS REQ message she has
sent (as evidenced by the role state predicate L). These cover errors due specifically to an expired Ticket-Granting
Ticket (β3.2′ ) and generic errors (β3.2′′ ); in both cases the contents of the error message are stored in the TGSErrorC
predicate, although these data are not used elsewhere in this formalization.
The role of the TGS in this exchange is shown in Figure 24. This formalization adds the time data tT,end, the
expiration time of the service ticket obtained via the constraint STicketExp, and tT,auth, the current time on T ’s local
clock obtained via ClockT . T also performs an explicit temporal check, given by the constraint tT,auth < tK,end,
to ensure that the ticket-granting ticket has not expired; this check is not performed by the constraint V alidT , which
does not have access to the local time tT,auth.
Rule β4.1′ allows T to respond to a KRB TGS REQ message which contains an expired ticket-granting ticket (in
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∃L : client× TGS× nonce.
∀T : TGS .
∀K : KAS.
β1.1
−→
∃n1 : nonce
N(C, T, n1)
L(C, T, n1)
∀. . . .
∀kC : dbK C .
∀AKey : shK C T.
∀X : msg .
∀n1 : nonce .
∀tK,auth : time .
∀tK,end : time .
N(C,X, {AKey, n1, tK,auth,
tK,end, T}kC )
L(C, T, n1)
β1.2
−→
AuthC(X,T,AKey,
tK,auth, tK,end)
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
∀tK,err : time .
N(KRB ERROR, tK,err,
ErrorCode, C,K)
L(C, T, n1)
β1.2′
−→
ASErrorC(KRB ERROR,
tK,err, ErrorCode,K)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 21: The client’s role in the B level Authentication Service Exchange.
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∀C : client .
∀T : TGS .
∀n1 : nonce .
∀kC : dbK C .
∀kT : dbK T .
∀AKey : shK C T .
∀tK,end : time .
∀tK,auth : time .
N(C, T, n1)
V alidK(C, T, n1)
ClockK(tK,auth)
ATicketExp(C, T,
tK,auth, tK,end)
β2.1
−→
∃AKey : shK C T
N(C, {AKey,C,
tK,auth, tK,end}kT ,{AKey, n1, tK,auth,
tK,end,T}KC )
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
∀tK,err : time .
N(C, T, n1)
InvalidK(C, T, n1, ErrorCode)
ClockK(tK,err)
β2.1′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tK,err,
ErrorCode, C,K)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀K:KAS
Figure 22: The authentication server’s role in the B level Authentication Service Exchange.
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∃L : client(C) × server × TGS(T ) × shK C T × time×nonce.
∀T : TGS .
∀S : server .
∀AKey : shK C T .
∀X : msg .
∀tC,Treq : time .
∀tK,auth : time .
∀tK,end : time .
AuthC(X,T,AKey,
tK,auth, tK,end)
ClockC(tC,Treq)
β3.1
−→
∃n2 : nonce
N(X, {C, tC,Treq}AKey,
C, S, n2)
AuthC(X,T,AKey,
tK,auth, tK,end)
L(C, S, T,AKey, tC,Treq, n2)
∀. . . .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀Y : msg .
∀n2 : nonce .
∀tT,auth : time .
∀tt,end : time .
N(C, Y, {SKey, n2, tT,auth,
tT,end,S}AKey)
L(C, S, T,AKey, tC,Treq,n2)
β3.2
−→
ServiceC(Y, S, SKey,
tT,auth, tT,end)
∀. . . .
∀KRB ERROR : msg.
∀TKT EXP : msg .
∀tT,err : time .
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Treq,
tT,err, TKT EXP, C, T )
L(C, S, T,AKey, tC,Treq,n2)
β3.2′
−→ TGSErrorC(tC,Treq, tT,err, TKT EXP, T )
∀. . . .
∀ErroCode : msg.
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Treq,
tT,err, ErrorCode, C, T )
L(C, S, T,AKey, tC,Treq,n2)
β3.2′′
−→ TGSErrorC(tC,Treq, tT,err, ErrorCode, T )
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 23: The client’s role in the B level Ticket-Granting Exchange.
which case the constraint tT,err ≥ tK,end is satisfied). Note that the V alidT constraint (which checks the validity
of every aspect of the request except that the ticket is not expired) is satisfied. Everything else is similar to the error
messages sent by K in the Authentication Service exchange. Rule β4.1′′ allows T to respond to a KRB TGS REQ
message which is invalid for some other reason (as determined by the InvalidT external process).
6.3 The Client/Server Exchange with mutual authentication
The client’s role in this exchange is shown in Figure 25. Rules β5.1 and β5.2 extend the A level rules α5.1 and α5.2 by
adding the time data tT,auth and tT,end to the predicate ServiceC and by explicitly setting the MUTUAL REQUIRED bit
in the KRB AP REQmessage. Recall that tC,Sreq was the only timestamp already included in the A level formalization.
Rules β5.2′ and β5.2′′ are essentially the same as rules β3.2′ and β3.2′′ in the Ticket-Granting Exchange.
The server’s role in this exchange is shown in Figure 26. Rule β6.1 extends rule α6.1 to account for the time data
now in the KRB AP REQ message (including in the validity check by V alidS and the data saved in MemS); S also
ensures that the service ticket has not expired using the constraintsClockS(tS,now) and tS,now < tT,end. Note that if S
accepts C’s request, he sends a confirmation message because the MUTUAL REQUIRED bit was set in the KRB AP REQ
message.
Rule β6.1′ parallels rule β4.1′ in the Ticket-Granting Exchange and allows S to send an error message in response to
a KRB AP REQmessage which is valid except for an expired ticket (so that the constraints V alidS(C, tT,auth, tC,Sreq)
and tS,err ≥ tT,end hold). Rule β6.1′′ allows S to send the appropriate error message in response to a KRB AP REQ
message which is invalid for some other reason.
6.4 The Client/Server Exchange without mutual authentication
The client’s role in this exchange is shown in Figure 27. Rule β5′.1 differs from rule β5.1 only in that the MUTUAL NON REQUIRED
bit is set in the KRB AP REQ message (with a corresponding change in the information saved in L) and the data for
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∀C : client .
∀S : server .
∀AKey : shK C T .
∀kT : dbK T .
∀kS : dbK S .
∀n2 : nonce .
∀tK,auth : time .
∀tK,end : time .
∀tT,auth : time .
∀tT,end : time .
∀tC,Treq : time .
N({AKey,C,
tK,auth, tK,end}kT ,{C, tC,Treq}AKey
C, S, n2)
V alidT (C, S, n2, tK,auth, tC,Treq)
STicketExp(C, S, tS,end)
ClockT (tT,auth)
tT,auth < tK,end
β4.1
−→
∃SKey : shK C S
N(C, {SKey,C,
tT,auth, tT,end}kS ,{SKey, n2, tT,auth,
tT,end,S}AKey)
∀. . . .
∀KRB ERROR : msg.
∀TKT EXP : msg .
∀tT,err : time .
N({AKey,C
tK,auth, tK,end}kT{C, tC,Treq}AKey,
C, S, n2)
V alidT (C, S, n2, tK,auth, tC,Treq)
ClockT (tT,err)
tT,err ≥ tK,end
β4.1′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Treq,
tT,err, TKT EXP, C, T )
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
N({AKey,C
tK,auth, tK,end}kT{C, tC,Treq}AKey,
C, s, n2)
InvalidT (C, S, n2, tK,auth, tC,Treq, ErrorCode)
ClockT (tT,err)
β4.1′′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Treq,
tT,err, ErrorCode, C, T )
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀T :TGS
Figure 24: The ticket granting server’s role in the B level Ticket-Granting Exchange.
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∃L : client(C) × server(S) × shK C S × time×msg×msg.
∀S : server .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀Y : msg .
∀tC,Sreq : time .
∀tT,auth : time .
∀tT,end : time .
ServiceC(Y, S, SKey, tT,auth, tT,end)
ClockC(tC,Sreq)
β5.1
−→
N(MUTUAL REQUIRED,
Y, {C, tC,Sreq}SKey)
ServiceC(Y, S, SKey, tT,auth, tT,end)
L(C, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y ,
MUTUAL REQUIRED)
∀. . ..
N({tC,Sreq}SKey)
L(C, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y ,
MUTUAL REQUIRED)
β5.2
−→ DoneMutC(S, SKey)
∀. . . .
∀KRB ERROR : msg.
∀TKT EXP : msg .
∀tS,err : time .
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq, tS,err,
TKT EXP, C, S)
L(C, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y )
β5.2′
−→ APErrorC(tC,Sreq, tS,err, TKT EXP, S)
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq, tS,err,
ErrorCode, C, S)
L(C, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y )
β5.2′′
−→ APErrorC(tC,Sreq, tS,err, ErrorCode, S)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 25: The client’s role in the B level Client/Server Exchange with mutual authentication.
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0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∀C : client .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀tC,Sreq : time .
∀kS : dbK S .
∀tS,auth : time .
∀tT,auth : time .
∀tT,end : time .
N(MUTUAL REQUIRED
{SKey,C, tT,auth, tT,end}kS ,{C, tC,Sreq}SKey)
ClockS(tS,now)
V alidS(C, tT,auth, tC,Sreq)
tS,auth < tT,end
β6.1
−→
N({tC,Sreq}SKey)
MemS(C, SKey, tC,Sreq,
tT,auth, tT,end)
∀. . . .
∀KRB ERROR : msg.
∀TKT EXP : msg .
∀tS,err : time .
N(MUTUAL REQUIRED,
{SKey,C, tT,auth, tT,end}kS ,{C, tC,Sreq}SKey)
V alidS(C, tT,auth, tC,Sreq)
ClockS(tS,err)
tS,err ≥ tT,end
β6.1′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq,
tS,err, TKT EXP, C, S)
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
N(MUTUAL REQUIRED,
{SKey,C, tT,auth, tT,end}kS ,{C, tC,Sreq}SKey)
InvalidS(C, tT,auth, tC,Sreq, ErrorCode)
ClockS(tS,err)
β6.1′′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq,
tS,err, ErrorCode, C, S)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀S:server
Figure 26: The end server’s role in the B level Client/Server Authentication Exchange with mutual authentication.
further communication with S (which is not modelled in this formalization) are stored in the DoneNoMutC predi-
cate. There is no analogue of rule β5.2 because C does not require a response from S. Rules β5′.2′ and β5′.2′′ simply
update rules β5.2′ and β5.2′′ to account for the change from MUTUAL REQUIRED to MUTUAL NON REQUIRED .
The server’s role in this exchange is shown in Figure 28. Rule β6′.1 is rule β6.1 with the (here undesired) response
from S omitted. Rules β6′.1′ and β6′.1′′ are the same as rules β6.1′ and β6.1′′ except that they handle bad requests in
which the MUTUAL NON REQUIRED bit is set.
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0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∃L : client(C) × server(S) × shK C S × time×msg ×msg.
∀S : server .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀Y : msg .
∀tC,Sreq : time .
ServiceC(Y, S, SKey
tT,auth, tT,end)
ClockC(tC,Sreq)
β5′.1
−→
N(MUTUAL NON REQUIRED,
Y, {C, tC,Sreq}SKey)
ServiceC(Y, S, SKey
tT,auth, tT,end)
L(C, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y
MUTUAL NON REQUIRED)
DoneNoMutC(S, SKey)
∀. . . .
∀KRB ERROR : msg.
∀TKT EXP : msg .
∀tS,err : time .
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq, tS,err,
TKT EXP, C, S)
L(C, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y,
MUTUAL NON REQUIRED)
β5′.2′
−→
APErrorC(tC,Sreq, tS,err,
TKT EXP, S)
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq, tS,err,
ErrorCode, C, S)
L(C, S, SKey, tC,Sreq, Y,
MUTUAL NON REQUIRED)
β5′.2′′
−→
APErrorC(, tC,Sreq, tS,err,
ErrorCode, S)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀C:client
Figure 27: The client’s role in the B level Client/Server Exchange without mutual authentication.
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
∀C : client .
∀SKey : shK C S.
∀tC,Sreq : time .
∀kS : dbK S .
∀tS,auth : time .
∀tT,auth : time .
∀tT,end : time .
N(MUTUAL NON REQUIRED
{SKey,C, tT,auth, tT,end}kS ,{C, tC,Sreq}SKey)
ClockS(tS,auth)
V alidS(C, tT,auth, tC,Sreq)
tS,auth < tT,end
β6′.1
−→
MemS(C, SKey, tC,Sreq,
tT,auth, tT,end)
∀. . . .
∀KRB ERROR : msg.
∀EXP ERR : msg .
∀tS,err : time .
N(MUTUAL NON REQUIRED,
{SKey,C, tT,auth, tt,end}kS ,{C, tC,Sreq}SKey)
V alidS(C, tT,auth, tC,Sreq)
ClockS(tS,err)
tS,err ≥ tT,end
β6′.1′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq, tS,err,
TKT EXP, C, S)
∀. . . .
∀ErrorCode : msg.
N(MUTUAL NON REQUIRED,
{SKey,C, tT,auth, tt,end}kS ,{C, tC,Sreq}SKey)
InvalidS(C, tT,auth, tC,Sreq, ErrorCode)
ClockS(tS,err)
β6′.1′′
−→
N(KRB ERROR, tC,Sreq, tS,err,
ErrorCode)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
∀S:server
Figure 28: The end server’s role in the B level Client/Server Exchange without mutual authentication.
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Part III
Analyzing Kerberos 5
7 Anomalous Protocol Behavior
In this section we describe some anomalous protocol behavior that we have noted as we have analyzed Kerberos 5.
This does not pose a fundamental threat to the security of the protocol—in Section 9 we prove that Kerberos 5 enjoys
a number of confidentiality and authentication properties—so the traces described in this section may be viewed as
‘interesting curiosities.’
We believe that the attack found by Mitchell, Mitchell, and Stern [14] against a simplified version of Kerberos 5
does not appear in our formalization because in their encoding the KRB TGS REP message from T to C did not
include S encrypted under AKey.
7.1 Ticket anomaly
The primary structural difference between versions 4 and 5 of Kerberos is the manner the KAS and the TGS transmit
the ticket-granting and service tickets. In Kerberos 4, the client receives these tickets as part of the data encrypted
under either her long term (dbK) key or a session key that she knows. We saw that version 5 sends the tickets as a
separate component without additional encryption. Thus it is possible for the intruder to take advantage of this new
message structure to tamper with the unprotected ticket (although she is unable to cause serious problems by doing so).
Figure 29 updates figure 4 to illustrate the message flow in one such scenario. An MSR trace realizing this anomaly
in our A level formalization is given in Appendix C.1.
Client (C) Intruder (I) KAS (K) TGS (T ) Server (S)
• •-C, T, n1
• •ﬀ
C, {AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n1, T}kC
•• ﬀ
C,X, {AKey, n1, T}kC
• •-
X, {C}AKey, C, S, n2
• •-
{AKey,C}kT , {C}AKey, C, S, n2
• •ﬀ
C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n2, S}AKey
• •-
{SKey,C}kS , {C, tC,Sreq}SKey
• •ﬀ
{tC,Sreq}SKey
Figure 29: A level message flow in the ticket anomaly.
Here C sends her KRB AS REQ message as usual, but the intruder intercepts the KRB AS REP message from K.
She replaces the ticket with a generic message X and stores the ticket in her memory; C cannot detect this because
she expects to be unable to read the contents of the ticket. When C tries to send a KRB TGS REQ message to T (using
the meaningless X instead of the ticket), I intercepts this message and replaces X with the original ticket from K
and forwards the result (a well-formed KRB TGS REQ message) to T . T replies with a ticket for S, and the protocol
continues as though the intruder had taken no action.
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As a result of the actions of the intruder, T has granted a service ticket to C even though C has never sent a
valid KRB TGS REQ message (she does think that she has, however). Moreover, barring additional interference by
the intruder, subsequent requests by the client using the “ticket” X in her possession will fail for reasons unknown
to the her. This anomaly does not appear to provide an attack against keys, but it does give a counterexample to the
direct translation of a property of Kerberos 4: when Theorem 6.22 of [1] is translated to our A level formalization of
Kerberos 5, it becomes the following.
Violated Property 1. For C : client, T : TGS, AKey : shK C T , kT : dbK T , and S : server, if {C}AKey and
{AKey,C}kT have appeared on the network (possibly encrypted), and I does not have access to AKey, then for
some n2 : nonce, C put the message {AKey,C}kT , {C}AKey, C, S, n2 on the network.
As our example shows, this property does not hold in our A level formalization of Kerberos 5; it does not hold
in our C level formalization either. It was possible for it to hold in Kerberos 4 because the message in that protocol
sent from K to C was the equivalent of (after omitting timestamps) {AKey, T,TGT}kC , where TGT is the ticket-
granting ticket. This includes the ticket for T in the encryption under kC : dbK C, unlike the KRB AS REP message
C,TGT , {AKey, n1, T}kC , preventing the intruder from replacing it with any other message before it reaches C.
For the same reasons, Kerberos 5 does not have the following property, the translation to our A level formalization of
another theorem proved for Kerberos 4 in [2].
Violated Property 2. For C : client, T : TGS, Y : msg, AKey : shK C T , n1 : nonce, kC : dbK C, and kT : dbK T ,
if C, Y, {AKey, n1, T}kC appears on the network and I does not have access to kC , then Y = {AKey,C}kT and T
put the message C, {AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n1, t}kC on the network.
Note that the intruder may do the same thing with the KRB TGS REP message (instead of the KRB AS REP
message as just described), replacing the ticket for S with an arbitrary message and then reversing the switch when
C sends a KRB AP REQ message to S. This scenario shows that the translation of Theorem 6.23 of [1] fails for
Kerberos 5, as does a corresponding theorem in [2].
The amount of practical concern raised by the ticket anomaly seems slight; here the intruder and client together
function as the client is intended to [19]. Even with this anomaly, we are still able to prove in Section 9 that the tickets
and authenticators originated with the proper principals.
The ticket anomaly can also be realized in the C level formalization. It is not prevented by the checksum sent by C
in the KRB TGS REQ message, which is taken over the KRB-REQ-BODY part of the message and thus does not cover
the ticket (in the C level formalization, this checksum is taken over just the fields TOpts, C, S, n2, e). The anomaly
appears to be fixed if the ticket-granting ticket (or what C thinks is this ticket) is also included in the above checksum,
although this remains to be proved.
7.2 Anonymous ticket switch anomaly
Another anomaly involving the cutting and pasting of tickets makes use of the anonymous ticket option formalized
in our C level formalization. We make no assumptions about the application specific checksums C sends in the
KRB AP REQ messages other than that they agree with the local policy of the server S. Figure 30 shows the message
flow for this anomaly (the ‘anonymous ticket switch anomaly’).
This scenario begins with a normal AS exchange, after which C has a ticket-granting for use with a TGS, the name
T of the TGS, and the corresponding session key AKey. C desires two tickets, one NON-ANONYMOUS and the other
ANONYMOUS , from T for a single server S and sends the appropriate KRB TGS REQ messages to T . T responds with
the NON-ANONYMOUS service ticket ST1 containing key AKey1 and the ANONYMOUS service ticket ST2 containing
the key AKey2 (along with the appropriate other components of these messages). I intercepts both messages, swaps
the tickets, and forwards the resulting messages on to C, who then has incorrect beliefs about which (opaque) ticket
contains her identity. She then sends S two requests for service without mutual authentication, one using each of
these tickets, which the intruder intercepts. I forwards both of these messages to the server S after replacing the
authenticator encrypted with SKey2 with the authenticator encrypted with SKey1. The server can open the ticket
in each of these messages, but only the key in the NON-ANONYMOUS service ticket ST1 will open the accompanying
authenticator. S thus accepts the NON-ANONYMOUS request and generates an error message (not included here; in the
C level formalization, error messages are sent only if the ticket and authenticator match) in response to the malformed
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Client (C) Intruder (I)KAS (K) TGS (T ) Server (S)
• •-KOpts,C, T, n, e
• •ﬀ
C,TGT, {AKey, n, TF lags,T}ekC
• •-
TGT, {C,MD1 , tC,Treq1}AKey, TOpts(C),C, S, n1, e
• •-
TGT, {C,MD2 , tC,Treq2}AKey, TOpts(USER),C, S, n2, e
• •ﬀ
C, ST1, {SKey1, n1, SF lags(C),S}eAKey
• •ﬀ
C, ST2, {SKey2, n2, SF lags(USER),S}eAKey
• •ﬀ
C,ST2, {SKey1, n1, SF lags(C),S}eAKey
• •ﬀ
C, ST1, {SKey2, n2, SF lags(USER),S}eAKey
• •-
SOpts1,ST2, {C,MD1 ′,tC,Sreq1}SKey1
• •-
SOpts2,ST1, {USER,MD2 ′,tC,Sreq2}SKey2
• •-
SOpts1,ST2, {C,MD1 ′,tC,Sreq1}SKey1
• •-
SOpts2,ST1, {C,MD1 ′,tC,Sreq1}SKey1
• •ﬀ
KRB ERROR AP(ST2, USER)
• •ﬀ
KRB ERROR AP(ST2, C)
Figure 30: C level message flow in the anonymous ticket switch anomaly.
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request. The generic username from the ANONYMOUS ticket is placed in this error message; I may intercept this
(unencrypted) message and replace the generic name with C’s name, forwarding the result to C. C then processes
this message and, seeing her name, may believe that her NON-ANONYMOUS request was rejected and her ANONYMOUS
request was accepted. This situation is undesirable since C believes she has completed an ANONYMOUS exchange with
S and that she has not completed any exchange in which her identity has been received by S.
This anomaly violates properties proved by Bella and Paulson in [1, 2] for Kerberos 4, which are analogues for
the Client/Server Authentication Exchange of Violated Properties 1 and 2 in Section 7.1. This anomaly seems to be
avoided if the checksums in the KRB AP REQ messages are taken over the service ticket (so that the server S would
be aware of any ticket switches), although we have yet to prove that such a change would prevent this anomaly. The
checksum in the KRB AP REQ message is left as ‘application specific’ by the current protocol specification [18].
As in the case of the ticket anomaly, it is unclear whether the ticket switch anomaly is of practical concern. It does,
however, point out some of the interactions between different parts of the protocol, namely the ANONYMOUS options
and the structural change in messages made between versions 4 and 5 of the protocol. Even if something is known to
have gone wrong, the client cannot pinpoint when it went wrong; unlike, e.g., compilers, error messages in Kerberos
do not precisely identify the first point at which the trace deviated from the expected protocol run. Here the client gets
an error message from the server, even though the intruder first interfered in the protocol during the Ticket-Granting
Exchange.
7.3 Encryption type anomaly
We assume that C loses her long term (database) key kC associated with a particular encryption method e. She realizes
this, but before reporting the loss of this key (or possibly as she tries to make use of a service in order to do this) she
sends a KRB AS REQ message to K. C naturally specifies a different encryption method (e′ with key k′C) in order to
avoid a response using the lost key. Since this is sent in the clear, I can modify the request to force a response using
the compromised key kC (including the construction of a new checksum using the lost key if necessary). I may then
intercept and use the credentials from K’s response. Thus I may not only masquerade as C using the lost key, but
may also do this based upon any attempt that C makes to work around the known key loss. The message flow for this
anomaly is shown in Figure 31.
Client (C) Intruder (I) KAS (K) TGS (T )
• •-KOpts,C, T, n1, e
′
• •-KOpts,C, T, n1, e
• •ﬀ
C,TGT, {AKey, n1, TF lags,T}ekC
• •-
TGT, {C,MD , tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts,C, S, n2, e′′
• •ﬀ
C, ST, {SKey, n2, SF lags,S}e′′′AKey
KRB AS REQ : KOpts,C, T, n1, e
KRB AS REP : C,TGT, {AKey, n1, TF lags,T}ekC
KRB TGS REQ : TGT, {C,MD , tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts,C, S, n2, e′′
KRB TGS REP : C, ST, {SKey, n2, SF lags,S}e′′AKey
KRB ERROR−X : KRB ERROR, [−|tC,Treq|tC,Sreq], t(K|T |S),err, ErrCode, C, (K|T |S)
TGT = {TF lags,AKey,C}kT
ST = {SF lags,SKey,C}kS
MD = [TOpts, C, S, n2, e′′]AKey
Figure 31: Message flow for encryption type anomaly
Note that this anomaly is not fixed by the checksum that C can send with the KRB AS REQ message (which we do
not include in our formalizations, but is described in [16] as optional), keyed with a dbK C, as the following scenario
shows. C puts C, T, n, e′, [C, T, n, e′]e′k′C on the network and I intervenes, replacing it with C, T, n, e, [C, T, n, e]
e
kC
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(which I can do, since the hash is public and she knows kC and e). Then the action continues as above, with I gaining
knowledge of AKey.
A lost long term key is quite serious, as it allows the intruder to obtain and use credentials in the name of the client
whose key has been compromised. Raeburn [19] has noted that when this happens the key database must be updated
to prevent the lost key from being used. We have not yet formalized the database update mechanism(s); the effect of a
compromised key on these is unclear.
7.4 Ticket replay anomaly
We now look at another anomaly whose effects resemble those of the anonymous ticket switch anomaly; the actions
of the intruder are different, but again make use of the ability to cut tickets out of messages. The intruder uses a replay
to unpack the timestamp encrypted in the authenticator by inducing the server to return it in an (unencrypted) error
message. She could also guess this timestamp using rule TA, but we see here that she does not need this rule (which
may be unreasonably strong) in order for this anomaly to be realized. Figure 32 shows the message flow for this
anomaly, which proceeds as follows.
Client (C) Intruder (I)KAS (K) TGS (T ) Server (S)
• •-KOpts,C, T, n1, e
• •ﬀ
C,TGT, {AKey, n1, TF lags,T}ekC
• •-
TGT, {C,MD , tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts,C, S, n2, e
• •-
TGT, {C,MD ′, t′C,Treq}AKey, TOpts′,C, S, n′2, e
• •ﬀ
C, ST, {SKey, n2, SF lags,S}eAKey
• •ﬀ
C,ST′, {SKey′, n′2, SF lags′,S}eAKey
• •-
SOpts,ST, {C,MD ′′,t}SKey
• •-
SOpts′,ST′, {C,MD ′,t′}
SKey′
• •-
SOpts,ST, {C,MD ′′,t}SKey
• •-
SOpts,ST, {C,MD ′′,t}SKey
• •ﬀ
KRB ERROR, t, tS,err, REPLAY, C, S
• •ﬀ
KRB ERROR, t, tS,err, ErrCode, C, S
Figure 32: Message flow in the ticket replay anomaly
A client initiates and completes the Authentication Service Exchange with an authentication server, obtaining a
ticket granting ticket TGT for a TGS T . She then uses TGT to make two requests for service tickets for a single
server, requesting different options for these two service tickets.
T receives these two requests, and grants two different service tickets ST and ST ′ with associated session keys
SKey and SKey′; we assume that the options actually granted by T are different for these two tickets. Recall that
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T sends a copy of the granted options along with the new session key (both encrypted under the session key shared
by the client and T ), so the client associates the different granted options with these different keys. The client then
sends two requests to the server, one with ST and an authenticator encrypted using SKey and containing a timestamp
t and other with ST ′, SKey′ and t′, respectively. We assume that in both requests, the client does not request mutual
authentication from the server, so she expects a response only in case of an error.
The intruder intercepts these requests. She duplicates the request containing ST , SKey, and t and forwards these
to the server, who accepts the first and rejects the second because of the replayed authenticator. This prompts an error
message, containing t, from the server, which the intruder may intercept, modify, and send to the client. The intruder
does not send the second request, containing ST ′, SKey′, and t′, to the server.
As a result, the client receives an error message containing the timestamp t but no response to her request contain-
ing ST ′, SKey′, and t′. She might assume that her first request was rejected while her second was accepted, while
the reverse is actually true. This is potentially worrisome because the options on the tickets are different; in the case of
anonymous tickets, the client might erroneously assume that her identity has not been seen by the server (if the error
is tied to a non-anonymous ticket).
As for the ticket switch anomaly, it is unclear whether this anomaly is of practical concern. It does highlight the
interactions between the ticket options and other traces; for the anonymous ticket option, these may be particularly
undesirable. We also note that since our formalizations do not include explicit checks for replayed authenticators, this
anomaly may not be realizable in these formalizations.
7.5 Possible replays
The abstraction of the A level formalization, in particular the omission of nonce and timestamp checks, precludes the
detection of replayed messages. The KRB AS REQ, KRB TGS REQ, and KRB AP REQ messages may be intercepted
by the intruder, copied, and then forwarded to the intended server with the intruder maintaining a copy. The intruder
may then, at a later time, replay the copied messages. If the original messages were accepted by the server then the
replays may be as well, in which case the servers would generate fresh credentials based upon the replayed requests.
These possible replays differ from the ticket replay anomaly in that they would be used to force the creation of fresh
credentials.
In order to prevent replayed authenticators, TGSes and servers should save the included timestamps for the length
of the allowable clock skew. For the Client-Server Exchange, Version 10 of the protocol revisions (Section 3.2.3
of [16]) makes the following note.
Unless the application server provides its own suitable means to protect against replay (for example,
a challenge-response sequence initiated by the server after authentication, or use of a server-generated
encryption subkey), the server must utilize a replay cache to remember any authenticator presented within
the allowable clock skew.
Jeffrey [12] has observed that this may place an unreasonable burden on application servers, and that (at least some
of) these servers do not in practice make use of a replay cache.
8 Rank and Corank Functions
We now define the two classes of functions—rank and corank—which we use to prove results about our MSR for-
malizations of the Kerberos 5 protocol. These are inspired by work of Schneider [20] in CSP; related ideas have been
discussed in the context of strand spaces [21]. Rank functions are generally used to prove results about data origin
authentication, while corank functions are used to prove confidentiality results. Intuitively, the former class captures
the amount of work done to produce a certain message, while the latter class captures the amount of work needed to
extract a certain (hopefully secret) message. We shall see that because the abilities to encrypt and extract messages are
not perfectly symmetric, these classes of functions differ in important ways.
In order to use these types of functions in the MSR formalization of a protocol, we need to define their values on
facts. Just as facts are built up from atomic terms in the language of the protocol, we inductively define rank and corank
functions starting with their values on atomic terms and then defining the effects on these values of the operations used
to build non-atomic terms. The extension of these definitions from terms to facts requires some care in the case of
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corank functions; we note some general principles which appear to be applicable to this process and then use these to
define this class of functions for our formalizations of Kerberos 5.
8.1 Rank
The k-rank relative to m0 is intended to capture the amount of work done using the key k to encrypt exactly the
message m0. We start with the definition of rank for terms. Let k be a key, t, t1, t2 terms, and m0 a msg. Then we
define the k-rank of t relative to m0, denoted by ρk(t;m0), by
ρk(t;m0) =

0, t is an atomic term
ρk(m1;m0) + 1, t = {m1}k, ρk(m1;m0) > 0
0, t = {m1}k, ρk(m1;m0) = 0, m1 6= m0
1, t = {m0}k
ρk(m1;m0), t = {m1}k′ , k′ 6= k
ρk(m1;m0) + 1, t = [m1]k, ρk(m1;m0) > 0
0, t = [m1]k, ρk(m1;m0) = 0, m1 6= m0
1, t = [m0]k
ρk(m1;m0), t = [m1]k′ , k
′ 6= k
max{ρk(t1;m0), ρk(t2;m0)}, t = t1, t2
. (1)
If t is atomic, then no work has been done to encrypt the message m0 and we set the rank equal to 0. If t is exactly
the message {m0}k we set the rank equal to 1. Encrypting any message of positive k-rank with the key k increases
the rank by 1 as additional work has been done using k, while encryption with k′ 6= k has no effect on k-rank.
Keyed checksums have the same effects, as these also represent cryptographic work done using k. The rank of the
concatenation of two messages equals the larger of the ranks of the constituent messages. We will be concerned
primarily with whether or not the k-rank relative to m0 of a message equals 0, i.e., whether or not {m0}k is contained
within the message.
The extension of rank from terms to facts is straightforward; intuitively, the number of nested encryptions of m0
using k which must have occurred to produce a certain predicate equals the maximum number of such encryptions
which were needed to produce one of the arguments of the predicate. Formally, for k a key, m0 and m of type msg, and
t, ti terms, and P any predicate in the protocol signature, we define the k-rank of a fact F relative to m0 (ρk(F ;m0))
by
ρk(P (t1, . . . , tj);m0) = max
1≤i≤j
ρk(ti;m0). (2)
In particular, we have
ρk(N(m);m0) = ρk(m;m0) (3)
ρk(I(t);m0) = ρk(t;m0). (4)
For a multiset A of finitely many distinct facts, we define the k-rank of A relative to m0 by
ρk(A;m0) = max
F∈A
ρk(F ;m0) (5)
if A 6= ∅, and let ρk(∅;m0) = 0.
Given a rule
F1, . . . , Fi → ∃x1 . . . ∃xnG1, . . . , Gj ,
we say that this rule increases (preserves, weakly decreases, etc.) k-rank relative to m0 if
ρk({F1, . . . , Fi};m0) < ρk({G1, . . . , Gj};m0)
(=, ≥, etc.). If, in an MSR trace the k-rank of a multiset Mi+1 is greater (less than) the previous multiset Mi, then the
rule used to obtain Mi+1 must increase (decrease), possibly weakly, relative k-rank; it is clear that the converse does
not hold in general.
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Any reasonable formulation of the intruder should be such that the intruder cannot do cryptographic work using
the key k (as measured by relative k-rank) without possessing the key k. Formally, we expect the intruder rules to
satisfy the following property.
Property 1. If an intruder rule R can increase k-rank relative to m0, then the left hand side of R contains I(k).
As expected, this property is true for our formalizations of the Dolev-Yao intruder. Before proving this, we state the
assumption made in Section 4.4.2 about the intruder rule MG as an axiom involving rank functions.
Axiom 1. If a multiset Mi+1 is obtained from a multiset Mi by an application of rule MG and I(X) is the unique fact
in Mi+1 \Mi (i.e., X : msg is the message freshly generated by the intruder using MG), then for every k : key and
m0 : msg, ρk(X;m0) = 0.
We may now prove that Property 1 in the formalizations of Kerberos 5 that we have analyzed.
Lemma 1. Property 1 holds in our A level formalization of Kerberos 5, i.e., for any k : key and m0 : msg, any A level
intruder rule which increases k-rank relative to m0 contains the fact I(k) on its left hand side.
Proof. Inspection of A level intruder rules shows that of the network, pairing, and encryption rules, only SEC′ and
DEC′ could increase relative k-rank. If either of these rules increases k0-rank relative to m0, then the key k mentioned
by each of these rules must equal k0. Among the data generation rules, MG is the only one the relative k-rank of whose
right hand side is not obviously equal to 0, but this holds by Axiom 1. Finally, the right hand side of each data access
rule is I(t) for some atomic term t, so none of these can increase relative k-rank.
Lemma 2. Property 1 holds in our C level formalization of Kerberos 5, i.e., for any k : key and m0 : msg, any C level
intruder rule which increases k-rank relative to m0 contains I(k) on its left hand side.
Proof. The addition of encryption types does not change the arguments given in the proof of Lemma 1. Among the
rules specific to our C level formalization, EA, OA, and FA create atomic messages (with relative k-rank equal to 0).
If an application of MD increases k-rank relative to m0, then the key used by the must be k; we see that the left hand
side of this rule then contains the fact I(k).
Our approach to data origin authentication is outlined by the following theorem, which might be viewed as a loose
analogue of Schneider’s rank function theorem for our rank functions (recall that it is our corank functions which more
closely parallel Schneider’s rank functions).
Theorem 1. If ρk(F ;m0) = 0 for every fact F in the initial state of a trace and no intruder rule can increase k-rank
relative to m0 then the existence of a fact F with ρk(F ;m0) > 0 in some non-initial state of the trace implies that
some honest principal fired a rule which produced a fact built up from {m0}k or [m0]k.
Proof. If no intruder rule can increase k-rank relative to m0, some honest participant must have fired a rule which
increased this rank from 0 to some positive value. A fact of positive k-rank relative to m0 must contain (as an
argument to the predicate) a term of positive k-rank relative to m0. By induction on the structure of terms, this term
must be built up from at least one of the two terms {m0}k and [m0]k.
We then authenticate the origin of {m0}k (assuming this was not present at the beginning of the trace) by ensuring the
confidentiality of k, invoking Property 1, and then determining which honest principal(s) could create {m0}k.
8.2 Corank
The E-corank relative to m0 is intended to capture the minimum amount of work, using keys from the set E, needed
to obtain the atomic message m0. As for rank, we start by inductively defining corank on terms and then extending
the definition to facts.
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Let E be a set of keys, m0 an atomic term of type msg, and t, t1, and t2 terms. Then we define the E-corank of t
relative to m0, denoted by ρˆE(t;m0), as
ρˆE(t;m0) =

∞, t is atomic, t 6= m0
0, t is atomic, t = m0
ρˆE(m1;m0) + 1, t = {m1}k, k ∈ E
ρˆE(m1;m0), t = {m1}k, k /∈ E
∞, t = [m1]k, k any key
min{ρˆE(t1;m0), ρˆE(t2;m0)}, t = t1, t2
(6)
If t is atomic then no work using keys from E is required to obtain m0 if t = m0, while no amount of such work can
extract m0 from t 6= m0. The number of decryptions using keys from E needed to obtain m0 from {m}k is the same
as or 1 more than the number needed to obtain m0 from m, depending on whether k /∈ E or k ∈ E. Since we assume
that message digestion is one-way, no amount of decryption can extract m0 from [m]k, regardless of whether or not
k ∈ E; this appears in gray since message digests appear in the signature of our C level protocol formalization but not
our A level formalization. A message m0 can be extracted from the concatenation of two terms by extracting it from
one of these two terms (since we are assuming that m0 is atomic), whence the final case.
The extension of the definition of corank from terms to facts requires more care than the parallel extension of rank.
For a memory predicate P with j arguments, a natural first definition of the E-corank of P (t1, . . . , tj) relative to m0
would be min1≤i≤j ρˆE(ti;m0). However, we wish to have principals store messages in predicates without necessarily
compromising the confidentiality of these messages (e.g., an honest principal storing an unencrypted session key in
memory does not correspond to the intruder knowing this key). If a certain argument to a predicate P will never be
placed on the network, we will ignore the term it contains when determining the E-corank of P . We thus modify
the initial definition given above to instead take the minimum to be over those i for which ti might be placed on the
network (to state this imprecisely). We leave a general approach to this problem for future work; for the moment, we
use this intuition to guide our extension of corank to facts as follows.
Let E be a set of keys, m0 an atomic term of type msg, m of type msg, and t, ti be terms. Then, for L any role state
predicate and considering all predicates which appear in our formalizations of Kerberos 5 (with gray type indicating
things present only in our C level formalization), we may define the E-corank of a fact F relative to m0 as follows.
ρˆE(N(m);m0) = ρˆE(m;m0)
ρˆE(I(t);m0) = ρˆE(t;m0)
ρˆE(AuthC(m1,m2,m3,m4);m0) = ρˆE(m1;m0)
ρˆE(ServiceC(m1,m2,m3,m4);m0) = ρˆE(m1;m0)
ρˆE(L(m1, . . . ,mj);m0) = ∞
ρˆE(DoneMutC(m1,m2);m0) = ∞
ρˆE(DoneNoMutC(m1,m2);m0) = ∞
ρˆE(MemS(m1,m2,m3);m0) = ∞
ρˆE(ASErrorC(m1,m2,m3,m4);m0) = ∞
ρˆE(TGSErrorC(m1,m2,m3);m0) = ∞
ρˆE(APErrorC(m1,m2,m3);m0) = ∞
For a multiset A of facts, we define the E-corank of A relative to m0 by
ρˆE(A;m0) = min
F∈A
ρˆE(F ;m0) (7)
if A 6= ∅, and let ρˆE(∅;m0) =∞.
We identify the confidentiality of m0 with the fact I(m0) being prohibited from appearing in a trace. As an
immediate consequence of the definition of the corank of facts, we see that corank relative to m0 is directly connected
to the confidentiality of m0 as follows.
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Lemma 3. Let m0 : msg be atomic. If there is any set E of keys such that no fact F with ρˆE(F ;m0) = 0 appears in
a trace, then that trace does not contain I(m0).
Proof. For every set E of keys, ρˆE(I(m0);m0) = ρˆE(m0;m0) = 0.
We expect that in any reasonable intruder formulation, if an intruder decreases the amount of decryption with keys
in the set E needed to learn a message, then she either knows some key protecting that message or she creates that
message herself. We formalize this as the following property.
Property 2. If an intruder rule R can decrease E-corank relative to m0, where I does not have access to m0 simply
by virtue of the type of m0, then the left hand side of R contains I(k) for some k ∈ E or R freshly generates m0.
As expected, this holds for both of our formalizations of the Dolev-Yao intruder.
Lemma 4. Property 2 holds for our A level formalization, i.e., if m0 is not a principal name, time, or key of one of the
types dbK I, shK I A for A : TS, or shK C I for C : client, then any A level intruder rule which decreases E-corank
relative to m0 either contains I(k) in its left hand side for some k ∈ E or freshly generates m0.
Proof. The only network, pairing, and encryption rules which can decrease relative corank are SDC′ and DDC′; if
one of these rules does indeed decrease E-corank, then the key k mentioned in each rule must belong to the set E. If
any data generation rule decreases E-corank relative to m0, by inspection we see that its right hand side must freshly
generate m0. The right hand side of each data access rule is I(t) for a term t whose type is assumed not to be the type
of m0, so the lemma is trivially true for these rules.
Lemma 5. Property 2 holds for our C level formalization, i.e., if m0 is not a principal name, time, etype, Flag, Opt,
or key of one of the types dbK I, shK I A for A : TS, or shK C I for C : client, then any C level intruder rule which
decreases E-corank relative to m0 either contains I(k) in its left hand side for some k ∈ E or freshly generates m0.
Proof. The addition of encryption types does not change any of the arguments used to prove the A level version
(Lemma 4). The new rule MD cannot decrease relative corank (the right hand side is I(m) for non-atomic m). The
new data access rules are covered by the data types listed in the statement of the lemma.
We prove confidentiality using the following result; like Theorem 1, this may be viewed as some type of analogue
of Schneider’s rank function theorem.
Theorem 2. If ρˆE(F ;m0) > 0 for every fact in the initial state of a trace, no intruder rule can decrease E-corank
relative to m0, and no honest principal creates a fact F with ρˆE(F ;m0) = 0, then m0 is secret throughout the trace.
Proof. We identify the secrecy of m0 throughout a trace with the MSR fact I(m0) never appearing in trace. Because
ρˆE(I(m0);m0) = 0 for every set E of keys, if the conditions of the theorem are satisfied, m0 is secret throughout the
trace in question.
We may thus show that m0 is confidential by finding some set E of keys, each of which is confidential (which may
require additional corank arguments) and which satisfies the conditions of this theorem.
9 Properties of Kerberos 5
In our work to date, we have established two types of properties for Kerberos 5. Since Kerberos is intended to provide
authentication, it is important to see what sort of authentication properties the protocol has. In proving authentication
properties of the protocol, we have also established confidentiality properties for various session keys which are
established during a protocol run. These properties are important in their own right, since some of the session keys
may be used in future communications between protocol participants.
We have established confidentiality and authentication properties connected to both the Ticket Granting Exchange
and the Client/Server Exchange. Since these exchanges have similar structure, it is not surprising that the properties are
expressed and indeed proved in very similar ways. Table 1 shows the parallel relationships between the properties that
we have established thus far. The confidentiality properties discussed here state that an intruder never learns certain
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Confidentiality Authentication
TG Exchange Property 3 Property 4
C/S Exchange Property 5 Property 6
Table 1: Properties established for Kerberos 5
information. The authentication properties that we have established are data origin authentication properties [11].
These show that if certain messages are ever seen on the network, then they must have been originally sent by a
specified protocol participant. Throughout this work, we assume the presence of a Dolev-Yao intruder. Additionally,
we do not intentionally leak keys to this intruder as was done in [1, 2, 3]
The properties related to the Ticket Granting Exchange have been established in both our A and C level formaliza-
tions. Properties 3 and 4 for our A level formalization were included, albeit in somewhat different form, in [6]. Their
extension to our C level formalization is a new result here. Properties 5 and 6, for the Client/Server Exchange, have so
far been proved only for the A level formalization; these results are also new since [6].
The precise statements and proofs of these properties are related in much the same way that the formalizations
themselves are related—removing some information from the detailed version gives the more abstract version. As
a result, we expect that we will soon be able to extend the properties of the Client/Server Exchange to our C level
formalization. In this section we outline the proofs of the theorems stated using gray text to indicate those parts of
the outline which are specific to the C level version of the property. The full proofs, which involve numerous minor
lemmas about individual MSR rules, are given in Appendix A
9.1 The Ticket-Granting Exchange
We start with the properties that we have established for the Ticket Granting Exchange. As this exchange is closer to
the beginning of the standard protocol run, these properties are slightly simpler than for the Client/Server Exchange
below.
Because the communications between the client and TGS use the shared key generated by the KAS which created
the ticket granting ticket, we want to ensure that this key remains confidential. In this exchange, the ticket granting
server produces credentials (a service ticket) in response to a request which contains a ticket granting ticket and an
authenticator. We thus also wish to authenticate the origin of these objects; in the case of the authenticator, which is
encrypted using the key shared between C and T , we make use of the confidentiality result for this exchange.
9.1.1 Confidentiality of AKey
The first property that we have established for Kerberos 5 is the confidentiality of the session key generated by the
Authentication Server, i.e., that the intruder does not learn this key. This parallels Theorem 6.18 of [1] for Kerberos 4.
Property 3. If the intruder does not know the long term secret keys (kC and kT ) used to encrypt the session key AKey
generated by the authentication server K for use by C and T , then the intruder cannot learn AKey.
We formalize this property for our A and C level formalizations as the following two theorems.
Theorem 3. ForC : client, T : TGS, C, T 6= I, kC : dbKC, kT : dbKT , AKey : shKCT , and n : nonce, if the initial
state of a finite trace does not contain I(kC) or I(kT ) and some K : KAS fires rule α2.1, freshly generating AKey and
creating the fact N(C, {AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n, T}kC ), then no state of the trace contains the fact I(AKey).
Theorem 4. For C : client, T : TGS, C, T 6= I, kC : dbK C, kT : dbK T , AKey : shK C T , TF lags : TFlag, and
n : nonce, if the initial state of a finite trace does not contain I(kC) or I(kT ) and some K : KAS fires rule γ2.1, freshly
generating AKey and creating the fact N(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n, TF lags,T}kC ), then no state of the
trace contains the fact I(AKey).
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Proof. (Sketch) We show that no fact whose {kC , kT }-corank equals 0 relative toAKey ever appears in the trace. (We
use this set of keys because one of them encrypts AKey whenever it is transmitted over the network.) K decreases
this corank when it freshly generates AKey, but not below 1; no KAS may otherwise decrease this corank. No client,
TGS, or server can ever decrease this corank, nor can the intruder. As this relative corank in question must have been
infinite for every fact in the trace before K freshly generated AKey, no fact whose {kC , kT }-corank equals 0 relative
to AKey can every appear in the trace.
9.1.2 Authentication of ticket-granting ticket and authenticator
The second property of Kerberos 5 is data origin authentication of the ticket and authenticator used in the client’s
request to the ticket granting server.
Property 4. If the intruder does not know the long term key used to encrypt a ticket-granting ticket and this ticket did
not exist at the beginning of the trace, then if the TGS processes a request, ostensibly from a client C, containing the
ticket-granting ticket and the session key AKey, then some Authentication Server created the session key AKey for
C to use with the TGS and also generated this ticket-granting ticket. Furthermore, if the intruder does not know the
long term key that the authentication server used to send AKey to C, then the authenticator was created by C.
We formalize this property for our abstract and detailed formalizations as the following two theorems.
Theorem 5. For C : client, T : TGS, C, T 6= I, S : server, AKey : shK C T , kT : dbK T , and n : nonce, if
the beginning state of a finite trace does not contain I(kT ) or any fact F with ρkT (F ;AKey,C) > 0, and at some
point in the trace T fires rule α4.1, consuming the fact N({AKey,C}kT , {C}AKey, C, S, n), then some K : KAS
previously fired rule α2.1, freshly generating AKey and producing the fact N(C, {AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n′, T}k′)for some n′ : nonce, and k′ : dbK C. Furthermore, if I(k′) did not appear in the initial state of the trace,
then after K fired rule α2.1 and before T fired rule α4.1, C fired rule α3.1, creating the fact N(X, {C}AKey,
C, S′, n′′) for some X : msg, S′ : server, and n′′ : nonce.
Theorem 6. For C : client, T : TGS, C, T 6= I, S : server, AKey : shKC T , kT : dbK T , TF lags : TFlag, ck : msg,
tC,Treq : time, TOpts : TOpt, e : etype, and n : nonce, if the beginning state of a finite trace does not contain I(kT )
or any fact F with ρkT (F ;TF lags,AKey,C) > 0, and at some point in the trace T fires rule γ4.1, consuming the fact
N({TF lags,AKey,C}kT , {C, ck, tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts,C, S, n, e), then some K : KAS previously fired rule γ2.1,
freshly generating AKey and producing the fact N(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n′, TF lags,T}e
′
k′) for some
n′ : nonce, e′ : etype, and k′ : dbKe
′
C. Furthermore, if I(k′) did not appear in the initial state of the trace, then after
K fired rule γ2.1 and before T fired rule γ4.1,C fired rule γ3.1, creating the factN(X, {C, [TOpts′, C, S′, n′′, e′′]AKey,
tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts′,C, S′, n′′, e′′) for some X : msg, TOpts′ : TOpt, e′′ : etype, S′ : server, and n′′ : nonce.
Proof. (Sketch) We first consider kT -rank relative to TF lags,AKey,C. No client, server, or TGS can increase
this rank, and I cannot increase it without knowing kT . Some K : KAS must have increased this rank; we see that
rule αγ2.1 was fired by K and the other claims of the first part of the theorem follow.
The assumption that I(k′) is not in the initial state of the trace allows us to apply Property 6, which shows that
I does not learn AKey. Thus I cannot increase AKey-rank relative to C, [TOpts′, C, S′, n′′, e′′]AKey, tC,Treq . No
KAS, TGS, or server will do so, and C is the only client who will; inspection of the client rules shows that she must
do so in the manner claimed.
9.2 The Client/Server Exchange
We now move to properties of the Client/Server Exchange; as this exchange parallels the Ticket Granting Exchange,
its properties parallel the properties we have proved for that exchange. These properties build on those stated above
and may be viewed as the main positive results that we have obtained thus far.
9.2.1 Confidentiality of SKey
The first property for the Client/Server Exchange gives conditions under which the session key shared by the client
and server is not known to the intruder. This parallels Theorem 6.19 of [1] for Kerberos 4.
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Property 5. If the intruder knows neither the long term secret key used by a TGS to encrypt the service ticket con-
taining a new session key SKey for a client to use with a server nor the session key used by the client to request the
service ticket, then the intruder cannot learn SKey.
We formalize this property for our abstract formalization as the following theorem. We have not yet proved Property 5
for our detailed formalization, but expect to do so soon.
Theorem 7. For C : client, T : TGS, S : server, kT : dbK T , kS : dbK S, SKey : shK C S, AKey : shK C T , and
n : nonce, if T fires rule α4.1, consuming the fact N({AKey,C}kT , {C}AKey, C, S, n), freshly generating SKey,
and creating the fact N(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n, S}AKey), and if the initial state of the trace does not contain
I(kS) and no state of the trace contains I(AKey), then no state of the trace contains I(SKey).
Proof. (Sketch)We show that no fact with {AKey, kS}-corank relative to SKey equal to 0 appears in the trace. The
only way that a TGS can decrease this corank is through T ’s rule firing as in the theorem statement; the resulting
multiset has {AKey, kS}-corank relative to SKey equal to 1, and this corank was infinite for every previous state in
the trace. No KAS, client, or server decreases this corank. The intruder cannot freshly generate SKey or decrease this
corank through other means, finishing the proof.
We may explicitly give conditions guaranteeing that I(AKey) doe not appear in the trace in order to obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 8. For C : client, T : TGS, S : server, kT : dbK T , kS : dbK S, SKey : shK C S, AKey : shK C T , and
n : nonce, if T fires rule α4.1, consuming the fact N({AKey,C}kT , {C}AKey, C, S, n), freshly generating SKey,
and creating the fact N(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n, S}AKey), and if the initial state of the trace did not contain
I(kT ), I(kS), I(kC) for every kC : dbK C, or any fact F with ρkT (F ;AKey,C), then no state of the trace contains
I(SKey).
9.2.2 Authentication of ST and authenticator
The second property for the Client/Server Exchange is our main result for this exchange and captures authentication
of the client C to the server S, again in the form of data origin authentication. It states conditions which guarantee
that if S receives a certain message (consisting of a service ticket and an authenticator), apparently sent by C, then the
service ticket originated with some T : TGS and the authenticator originated with C. The assumptions needed for the
theorem to hold are that the ticket did not already exist at the beginning of the trace, and that the intruder I does not
have access to the long term key of the server S or the key shared between C and the TGS T who generated the ticket.
Property 6. If the intruder does not know the long term key used to encrypt a service ticket for a client C to present
to a server S and this ticket did not exist at the beginning of the trace, then if S processes a request, ostensibly from C,
containing this service ticket and the session key SKey, then some Ticket Granting Server generated the session key
SKey for C to use with S and also created the service ticket. Furthermore, if the intruder never learns the session
key which the Ticket Granting Server used to encrypt SKey when sending the service ticket to C, then C created the
authenticator.
We formalize this property for our abstract formalization as the following theorem. We have not yet proved Property 6
for our detailed formalization, but expect to do so soon.
Theorem 9. For C : client, S : server, kS : dbK S, SKey : shK C S, and tC,Sreq : time, if the beginning
state of a finite trace does not contain I(kS) or any fact F with ρkS (F ;SKey,C) > 0, and at some point in the
trace S fires rule α6.1 consuming the fact N({SKey,C}kS , {C, tC,Sreq}SKey), then some T : TGS previously fired
rule α4.1, freshly generating SKey and producing the fact N(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n, S}k) for some n : nonce
and k : shKC T . Furthermore, if the fact I(k) has not yet appeared in the trace, then after T fired rule α4.1 and before
S fired the rule α6.1, C fired rule α5.1 to create the fact N(Y, {C, tC,Sreq}SKey) for some Y : msg.
Proof. (Sketch) We first consider kS-rank relative to SKey,C; this was 0 for all facts in the initial state of the trace
and S’s rule firing consumes a fact of positive kS-rank relative to SKey,C. No client, KAS, or server can increase
this rank, nor can the intruder. The only TGS that could do so is T and in the manner claimed.
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S’s rule firing also consumes a fact of positive SKey-rank relative toC, tC,Sreq; this rank must have been increased
during the protocol trace because SKey was freshly generated during the trace. We may invoke Property 3 to show
that I could not increase this rank; by inspection, we see that no KAS, TGS, or server could either. The only client
who could do so was C, and she must have done so in the manner claimed.
We may explicitly add hypotheses which will guarantee that I(k) does not appear in the trace; this gives us the
following corollary.
Corollary 10. For C : client, S : server, kS : dbK S, SKey : shK C S, and tC,Sreq : time, if the beginning
state of a finite trace does not contain I(kS) or any fact F with ρkS (F ;SKey,C) > 0, and at some point in the
trace S fires rule α6.1 consuming the fact N({SKey,C}kS , {C, tC,Sreq}SKey), then some T : TGS previously fired
rule α4.1, freshly generating SKey and producing the fact N(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n, S}k) for some n : nonce
and k : shK C T . Furthermore, if the initial state of the trace did not contain I(kC) for any kC : dbK C, or, for any
kT : dbK T , and if T 6= I, I(kT ) or any fact F with ρkT (F ; k,C) > 0, then after T fired rule α4.1 and before S fired
the rule α6.1, C fired rule α5.1 to create the fact N(Y, {C, tC,Sreq}SKey) for some Y : msg.
Part IV
Conclusions and References
10 Conclusions and Future Work
10.1 Conclusions
In this paper, we gave three formalizations of Kerberos 5 in the Multi-Set Rewriting (MSR) framework. The A level
formalization included just enough detail to prove authentication and confidentiality results for the protocol; due to
structural changes in the messages from Kerberos 4, these properties were slightly weaker than those proved for that
version of the protocol[1, 2, 3, 4]. The C level formalization was closer to the full protocol as given in [13, 16], adding
error messages, checksums, and a number of options to the A level formalization. Many of these details are new to
version 5 of Kerberos. We extended our analysis of the A level case to the C level, observing that the structure of the
proofs is preserved in doing this and again proving authentication and confidentiality properties of the protocol. The
B level formalization extended the A level in a different direction by adding timestamps and temporal checks. We did
not extensively analyze this formalization as these details are not significantly changed from Kerberos 4.
We noted four possible instances of curious protocol behavior, although none of these compromises the security
of the protocol. Three of these arose because tickets are not bound to the rest of the messages containing them (as
they were in Kerberos 4); one of these three was seen in both the A and C levels, while the other two made use of the
options in the C level formalization. The fourth anomaly was related to the encryption type option which was included
in the C level. It appeared that some of these anomalies may be prevented though the use of cryptographic checksums
beyond those specified in the protocol, but we have not yet formally proved this. We did not notice any new anomalies
in our informal analysis of the B level formalization.
The proofs of protocol properties made use of rank and corank functions, inspired by the work of Schneider [20].
Our analysis gave insight into approaches to reasoning about the MSR specifications of protocols. Throughout this
work, MSR proved to be an adequate language for formalizing and analyzing a real-world protocol.
10.2 Future work
We close with an outline of logical extensions of the work described in this paper.
Kerberos 5 is a complex protocol suite, with numerous details remaining to be formalized and analyzed. One
natural continuation of this work is the formalization and analysis of the common refinement of our B and C level
formalizations; this might be further extended to include even more timestamps and temporal checks, explicit consid-
eration of all options specified in [18] (in particular renewable and postdatable tickets), and the formalization of the
other available subprotocols (such as for client-server communication after authentication has been achieved).
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We have seen parallels between the analyses of the A and C level formalizations. The relationships between
different formalizations of Kerberos 5 and the corresponding relationships between their security properties (and the
proofs of these properties) should be investigated in a precise manner. Analysis including timestamps should be done,
either using the B level formalization or some refinement of it; additional work may be merited on anomalous behavior
in more detailed formalizations, how it might be prevented (including through modification of existing checksums in
the protocol), and whether such preventative measures would be worth implementing.
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Part V
Appendices
A Proofs of Protocol Properties
The structure of this appendix parallels the structure of Section 9, where the theorems proved here are originally stated.
A.1 The Ticket-Granting Exchange
A.1.1 Confidentiality of AKey
Theorem 3. ForC : client, T : TGS, C, T 6= I, kC : dbKC, kT : dbKT , AKey : shKCT , and n : nonce, if the initial
state of a finite trace does not contain I(kC) or I(kT ) and some K : KAS fires rule α2.1, freshly generating AKey and
creating the fact N(C, {AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n, T}kC ), then no state of the trace contains the fact I(AKey).
Proof. We claim that no fact with {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey equal to 0 appears in the trace.
By Lemma 8, if any KAS fires a rule which decreases {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey, then that rule freshly
generates AKey and, if the newly created fact in the resulting multiset is N(C, {AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n, T}kC ), the{kC , kT }-corank relative toAKey of this multiset equals 1. By Lemma 9, no previous multiset in the trace contained a
fact with finite {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey, nor can any KAS later fire a rule which decreases {kC , kT }-corank
relative to AKey.
By Lemmas 10, 11, and 12, no client, TGS, or server decreases {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey.
By hypothesis and Lemma 6, the facts I(kC) and I(kT ) never appear in the trace under consideration. By hypothe-
sis, K freshly generates AKey, so by Lemma 9 I cannot freshly generate AKey. Thus, by Lemma 13, I does not fire
any rule which decreases {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey.
As a result, no fact of {kC , kT }-corank 0 relative to AKey, in particular I(AKey), occurs in any multiset of the
trace.
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Theorem 4. For C : client, T : TGS, C, T 6= I, kC : dbK C, kT : dbK T , AKey : shK C T , TF lags : TFlag, and
n : nonce, if the initial state of a finite trace does not contain I(kC) or I(kT ) and some K : KAS fires rule γ2.1, freshly
generating AKey and creating the fact N(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n, TF lags,T}kC ), then no state of the
trace contains the fact I(AKey).
Proof. We claim that no fact with {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey equal to 0 appears in the trace.
By Lemma 14, if any KAS fires a rule which decreases {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey, then that rule freshly
generates AKey and, if the newly created fact in the resulting multiset is N(C, {AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n, T}kC ),
the {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey of this multiset equals 1. By Lemma 15, no previous multiset in the trace
contained a fact with finite {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey, nor can any KAS later fire a rule which decreases
{kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey.
By Lemmas 16, 17, and 18, no client, TGS, or server decreases {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey.
By hypothesis and Lemma 7, the facts I(kC) and I(kT ) never appear in the trace under consideration. By hypothe-
sis, K freshly generates AKey, so by Lemma 15 I cannot freshly generate AKey. Thus, by Lemma 19, I does not fire
any rule which decreases {kC , kT }-corank relative to AKey.
As a result, no fact of {kC , kT }-corank 0 relative to AKey, in particular I(AKey), occurs in any multiset of the
trace.
A.1.2 Authentication of TGT and authenticator
Theorem 5. For C : client, T : TGS, C, T 6= I, S : server, AKey : shK C T , kT : dbK T , and n : nonce, if
the beginning state of a finite trace does not contain I(kT ) or any fact F with ρkT (F ;AKey,C) > 0, and at some
point in the trace T fires rule α4.1, consuming the fact N({AKey,C}kT , {C}AKey, C, S, n), then some K : KAS
previously fired rule α2.1, freshly generating AKey and producing the fact N(C, {AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n′, T}k′)for some n′ : nonce, and k′ : dbK C. Furthermore, if I(k′) did not appear in the initial state of the trace,
then after K fired rule α2.1 and before T fired rule α4.1, C fired rule α3.1, creating the fact N(X, {C}AKey,
C, S′, n′′) for some X : msg, S′ : server, and n′′ : nonce.
Proof. T ’s firing of rule α4.1 consumes N({AKey,C}kT , {C}AKey, C, S, n2), a fact of kT -rank 1 relative to
AKey,C. As the initial state of the trace did not contain any fact F with ρkT (F ;AKey,C) > 0, some rule must have
been fired which increased kT -rank relative to AKey,C.
By Lemmas 20, 21, and 22, no client, server, or TGS can fire a rule which increases kT -rank relative to AKey,C.
By Lemmas 6 and 23, if the intruder fires a rule which increases kT -rank relative to AKey,C then the initial
state of the trace contains kT , a contradiction. Thus some K : KAS must have fired a rule which increased kT -
rank relative to AKey,C. By Lemma 24, the firing of that rule freshly generated AKey and created the fact
N(C, {AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n, T}k′) for some n : nonce and k′ : dbK C.
T ’s firing of rule α4.1 consumes a fact of AKey-rank 1 relative to C. Because AKey was freshly generated by
some rule fired in the trace, by Lemma 25 no fact in the initial state of the trace had positive AKey-rank relative to C;
thus some protocol participant must have fired a rule which increased this rank.
As I(k′) was not in the initial state of the trace, the conditions of Theorem 3 are satisfied (by hypothesis and the
first part of the theorem) and no state of the trace contains I(AKey). By Lemma 23, I cannot fire a rule which increases
AKey-rank relative to C. By Lemmas 26–28, no KAS, TGS, or server can fire a rule which increases AKey-rank
relative to C. Some C ′ : client must have fired a rule which increased AKey-rank relative to C; by Lemma 29, this
was C firing rule α3.1 and creating the fact N(X, {C}AKey, C, S′, n′) for some X : msg, S′ : server, and n′ : nonce.
Finally, Lemma 25 implies that K’s firing of rule α2.1 (freshly generating AKey) preceded C’s firing of rule α3.1.
Theorem 6. For C : client, T : TGS, C, T 6= I, S : server, AKey : shKC T , kT : dbK T , TF lags : TFlag, ck : msg,
tC,Treq : time, TOpts : TOpt, e : etype, and n : nonce, if the beginning state of a finite trace does not contain I(kT )
or any fact F with ρkT (F ;TF lags,AKey,C) > 0, and at some point in the trace T fires rule γ4.1, consuming the fact
N({TF lags,AKey,C}kT , {C, ck, tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts,C, S, n, e), then some K : KAS previously fired rule γ2.1,
freshly generating AKey and producing the fact N(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n′, TF lags,T}e
′
k′) for some
n′ : nonce, e′ : etype, and k′ : dbKe
′
C. Furthermore, if I(k′) did not appear in the initial state of the trace, then after
K fired rule γ2.1 and before T fired rule γ4.1,C fired rule γ3.1, creating the factN(X, {C, [TOpts′, C, S′, n′′, e′′]AKey,
tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts′,C, S′, n′′, e′′) for some X : msg, TOpts′ : TOpt, e′′ : etype, S′ : server, and n′′ : nonce.
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Proof. T ’s firing of rule γ4.1 consumes N({TF lags,AKey,C}kT , {C, ck, tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts,C, S, n, e), a fact of
kT -rank 1 relative to TF lags,AKey,C. As the initial state of the trace did not contain any factF with ρkT (F ;TF lags,
AKey,C) > 0, some rule must have been fired which increased kT -rank relative to TF lags,AKey,C.
By Lemmas 30, 31, and 32, no client, server, or TGS can fire a rule which increases kT -rank relative to TF lags,
AKey,C. By Lemmas 7 and 33, if the intruder fires a rule which increases kT -rank relative to TF lags,AKey,C then
the initial state of the trace contains kT , a contradiction. Thus some K : KAS must have fired a rule which increased
kT -rank relative to TF lags,AKey,C. By Lemma 34, the firing of that rule freshly generated AKey and created the
fact N(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}kT , {AKey, n1, TF lags, T}e
′
kC
) for some n1 : nonce, e′ : etype, and kC : dbKe
′
C.
T ’s firing of rule γ4.1 consumes a fact of AKey-rank 1 relative to C, ck, tC,Treq for some ck : msg and tC,Treq :
time. Because AKey was freshly generated by some rule fired in the trace, by Lemma 35 no fact in the initial state
of the trace had positive AKey-rank relative to C, ck, tC,Treq; thus some protocol participant must have fired a rule
which increased this rank.
As I(k′) was not in the initial state of the trace, the conditions of Theorem 4 are satisfied (by hypothesis and the first
part of the theorem) and no state of the trace contains I(AKey). By Lemma 33, I cannot fire a rule which increases
AKey-rank relative to C, ck, tC,Treq . By Lemmas 36–38, no KAS, TGS, or server can fire a rule which increases
AKey-rank relative to C, ck, tC,Treq . Some C ′ : client must have fired a rule which increased AKey-rank relative
to C; by Lemma 39, this was C firing rule γ3.1 and creating the fact N(X, {C, ck′, tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts′, C, S′,
n′2, e
′′) with ck′ = [TOpts′, C, S′, n′2, e′′]AKey , for some X : msg, TOpts′ : TOpt, S′ : server, n′2 : nonce, and
e′′ : etype. Finally, Lemma 35 implies that K’s firing of rule γ2.1 (freshly generating AKey) preceded C’s firing of
rule γ3.1.
A.2 The Client/Server Exchange
A.2.1 Confidentiality of SKey
Theorem 7. For C : client, T : TGS, S : server, kT : dbK T , kS : dbK S, SKey : shK C S, AKey : shK C T , and
n : nonce, if T fires rule α4.1, consuming the fact N({AKey,C}kT , {C}AKey, C, S, n), freshly generating SKey,
and creating the fact N(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n, S}AKey), and if the initial state of the trace does not contain
I(kS) and no state of the trace contains I(AKey), then no state of the trace contains I(SKey).
Proof. We claim that no fact with {AKey, kS}-corank relative to SKey equal to 0 appears in the trace.
By Lemma 40, if any TGS fires a rule which decreases {AKey, kS}-corank relative to SKey, then that rule freshly
generates SKey and, if the newly created fact in the resulting multiset is N(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n, S}AKey),
the {AKey, kS}-corank relative to SKey of this multiset equals 1. By Lemma 9, no previous multiset in the trace
contained a fact with finite {AKey, kS}-corank relative to SKey, nor can any TGS later fire a rule which decreases
{AKey, kS}-corank relative to SKey.
By Lemmas 41, 42, and 43, no KAS, client, or server decreases {AKey, kS}-corank relative to SKey.
By hypothesis, the fact I(AKey) never appears in the trace under consideration; by hypothesis and Lemma 6, the
fact I(kS) never appears in this trace. As T freshly generates SKey, by Lemma 9 I cannot freshly generate SKey.
Thus, by Lemma 13, I does not fire any rule which decreases {AKey, kS}-corank relative to SKey.
As a result, no fact of {AKey, kS}-corank 0 relative to SKey, in particular I(SKey), occurs in any multiset of
the trace.
Corollary 8. For C : client, T : TGS, S : server, kT : dbK T , kS : dbK S, SKey : shK C S, AKey : shK C T , and
n : nonce, if T fires rule α4.1, consuming the fact N({AKey,C}kT , {C}AKey, C, S, n), freshly generating SKey,
and creating the fact N(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n, S}AKey), and if the initial state of the trace did not contain
I(kT ), I(kS), I(kC) for every kC : dbK C, or any fact F with ρkT (F ;AKey,C), then no state of the trace contains
I(SKey).
Proof. We simply need to show that I(AKey) never appears in the trace; we may then apply Theorem 7 to see that
I(SKey) does not appear in any state of the trace. By Theorem 5, we see that some K : KAS fired rule α2.1 as
specified by that theorem. By hypothesis, for every k′ : dbK C, I(k′) does not appear in the trace, including its initial
state. Applying Theorem 3, we see that I(AKey) does not appear in the trace.
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A.2.2 Authentication of ST and authenticator
Theorem 9. For C : client, S : server, kS : dbK S, SKey : shK C S, and tC,Sreq : time, if the beginning
state of a finite trace does not contain I(kS) or any fact F with ρkS (F ;SKey,C) > 0, and at some point in the
trace S fires rule α6.1 consuming the fact N({SKey,C}kS , {C, tC,Sreq}SKey), then some T : TGS previously fired
rule α4.1, freshly generating SKey and producing the fact N(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n, S}k) for some n : nonce
and k : shKC T . Furthermore, if the fact I(k) has not yet appeared in the trace, then after T fired rule α4.1 and before
S fired the rule α6.1, C fired rule α5.1 to create the fact N(Y, {C, tC,Sreq}SKey) for some Y : msg.
Proof. S’s firing of rule α6.1 consumes N({SKey,C}kS , {C, tC,Sreq}SKey), a fact of kS-rank 1 relative to SKey,C.
As the initial state of the trace did not contain any fact F with ρkS (F ;SKey,C) > 0, some rule must have been fired
which increased kS-rank relative to SKey,C.
By Lemmas 44, 45, and 46, no client, KAS, or server can fire a rule which increases kS-rank relative to SKey,C.
By Lemmas 6 and 23, if the intruder fires a rule which increases kS-rank relative to SKey,C then the initial state of
the trace contains kS , a contradiction. Thus some T : TGS must have fired a rule which increased kS-rank relative
to SKey,C. By Lemma 47, this rule was α4.1 and T ’s firing of it consumed some fact N({k,C}kT , {C}k, C, S, n),
freshly generated SKey, and created the factN(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n′, S}k) for some k : shKCT , kT : dbKT ,
and n, n′ : nonce.
S’s firing of rule α6.1 consumes a fact of SKey-rank 1 relative toC, tC,Sreq . Because SKey was freshly generated
by some rule fired in the trace, by Lemma 25 no fact in the initial state of the trace had positive SKey-rank relative to
C, tC,Sreq; thus some protocol participant must have fired a rule which increased this rank.
As I(k) has not appeared in the trace, the conditions of Theorem 7 are satisfied (by hypothesis and the first part
of the theorem) and no state of the trace contains I(SKey). By Lemma 23, I cannot have fired a rule which increases
SKey-rank relative to C, tC,Sreq . By Lemmas 48–50, no KAS, TGS, or server can fire a rule which increases SKey-
rank relative to C, tC,Sreq . Thus some C ′ : client must have fired a rule which increased SKey-rank relative to
C, tC,Sreq; by Lemma 51, this was C firing rule α5.1 and creating the fact N(Y, {C, tC,Sreq}SKey) for some Y : msg.
Finally, Lemma 25 implies that T ’s firing of rule α4.1 (freshly generating SKey) preceded C’s firing of rule α5.1.
Corollary 10. For C : client, S : server, kS : dbK S, SKey : shK C S, and tC,Sreq : time, if the beginning
state of a finite trace does not contain I(kS) or any fact F with ρkS (F ;SKey,C) > 0, and at some point in the
trace S fires rule α6.1 consuming the fact N({SKey,C}kS , {C, tC,Sreq}SKey), then some T : TGS previously fired
rule α4.1, freshly generating SKey and producing the fact N(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n, S}k) for some n : nonce
and k : shK C T . Furthermore, if the initial state of the trace did not contain I(kC) for any kC : dbK C, or, for any
kT : dbK T , and if T 6= I, I(kT ) or any fact F with ρkT (F ; k,C) > 0, then after T fired rule α4.1 and before S fired
the rule α6.1, C fired rule α5.1 to create the fact N(Y, {C, tC,Sreq}SKey) for some Y : msg.
Proof. We simply need to guarantee that I(k) has not yet appeared in the trace; we may then apply Theorem 9 to get
the claimed result.
As T ’s firing of rule α4.1 produced the fact N(C, {SKey,C}kS , {SKey, n, S}k) for some n : nonce and k :
shK C T , it must have consumed a fact of the form N({k,C}k′T , {C}k, C, S, n) for some k
′
T : dbK T . We may
thus apply Theorem 5 to see that some K : KAS fired rule α2.1, freshly generating k and producing the fact
N(C, {k,C}k′T , {k, n
′, T}k′C ) for some n
′ : nonce and k′C : dbK C. By hypothesis, neither I(k′C) nor I(k′T ) ap-
peared in the initial state of the trace, so we may apply Theorem 3 to see that I(k) never appears in the trace.
B Lemmas for Authentication Properties
B.1 General lemmas
B.1.1 Lemmas for A level analysis
Lemma 6. For every principal P 6= I and every k : dbK P , if I(k) is in a state then I(k) was in the initial state of the
trace.
Proof. If I(k) appears on the right hand side of a rule for k : dbK P , then either I(k) appears on the left hand side of
the rule (DPD) or P = I (DA’).
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B.1.2 Lemmas for C level analysis
Lemma 7. For every principal P 6= I and every k : dbK P , if I(k) is in a state then I(k) was in the initial state of the
trace.
Proof. If I(k) appears on the right hand side of any rule for e : etype and k : dbKe P then either I(k) appears on the
left hand side of the rule (DPD) or P = I (DA’).
B.2 Lemmas for Ticket-Granting Exchange
B.2.1 Lemmas for Theorem 3
Lemma 8. For every T : TGS, C : client, k : shK C T , set E of keys, and K : KAS, if K fires an A level rule which
decreases E-corank relative to k, then the rule is rule α2.1 and its firing freshly generates k. Furthermore, the only
fact in the resulting multiset which is not in the previous multiset is N(C, {k,C}kT , {k, n, T}kC ) for some kC : dbKC,
kT : dbK T , and n : nonce, and the {kC , kT }-corank relative to k of the resulting multiset equals 1.
Proof. The only A level rule that an honest K : KAS may fire is α2.1. The only k : shK C T relative to which this
rule may decrease some E-corank is the key freshly generated by this rule. For some kC : dbK C, kT : dbK T , and
n : nonce this rule firing produces the fact N(C, {k,C}kT , {k, n, T}kC ), which has {kC , kT }-corank of 1 relative to
k. This is the only fact on the right-hand side of rule α2.1, and thus the only fact in the multiset resulting from this rule
firing that was not in the previous multiset of the trace. As k is freshly generated by this rule firing, by Lemma 9 no
fact appearing earlier in the trace had finite {kC , kT }-corank relative to k, so the {kC , kT }-corank relative to k of the
multiset resulting from this rule firing equals the {kC , kT }-corank relative to k of the new network fact.
Lemma 9. For every m0 : msg and set E of keys, if a fact F such that ρˆE(F ;m0) < ∞ occurs in a multiset of a
trace, then no rule fired later in the trace freshly generates m0.
Proof. If ρˆE(F ;m0) <∞, then at least one of the arguments to the predicate forming F must be a term built up from
m0 using symmetric encryption and concatenation. By the definition of freshness, if m0 is freshly generated by some
rule firing, no fact in any multiset earlier in the trace may be built up from m0.
Lemma 10. For every C,C ′ : client, T : TGS, set E of keys, and k : shK C T , no A level rule that C ′ fires decreases
E-corank relative to k.
Proof. Inspection of rules α1.1, α1.2, α3.1, α3.2, α5.1, and α5.2.
Lemma 11. For every C : client, T, T ′ : TGS, set E of keys, and k : shK C T , no A level rule that T ′ fires decreases
E-corank relative to k.
Proof. Inspection of rule α4.1.
Lemma 12. For every C : client, T : TGS, set E of keys, k : shK C T , and S : server, no A level rule that S fires
decreases E-corank relative to k.
Proof. Inspection of rule α6.1.
Lemma 13. For any nonempty set E of keys, C : client, T : TGS, C, T 6= I, key k′ : shK C T , and A level intruder
rule R, if R decreases E-corank relative to k′ then the left hand side of R includes I(k) for some k ∈ E or R freshly
generates k′.
Proof. Inspection of A level intruder rules.
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B.2.2 Lemmas for Theorem 4
Lemma 14. For every T : TGS, C : client, k : shK C T , set E of keys, and K : KAS, if K fires a C level rule which
decreases E-corank relative to k, then the rule is rule γ2.1 and its firing freshly generates k. Furthermore, the only
fact in the resulting multiset which is not in the previous multiset is N(C, {TF lags, k, C}kT , {k, n, TF lags,T}kC )for some kC : dbK C, kT : dbK T , TF lags : TFlag, and n : nonce, and the {kC , kT }-corank relative to k of the
resulting multiset equals 1.
Proof. The only C level rules that an honest K : KAS may fire are γ2.1 and γ2.1′ ; the latter cannot decrease E-corank
relative to any key. The only k : shK C T relative to which γ2.1 may decrease some E-corank is the key freshly
generated by this rule. For some kC : dbK C, kT : dbK T , TF lags : TFlag, and n : nonce this rule firing produces
the fact N(C, {TF lags,k, C}kT , {k, n, TF lags,T}kC ), which has {kC , kT }-corank of 1 relative to k. This is the only
fact on the right-hand side of rule γ2.1, and thus the only fact in the multiset resulting from this rule firing that was not
in the previous multiset of the trace. As k is freshly generated by this rule firing, by Lemma 15 no fact appearing earlier
in the trace had finite {kC , kT }-corank relative to k, so the {kC , kT }-corank relative to k of the multiset resulting from
this rule firing equals the {kC , kT }-corank relative to k of the new network fact.
Lemma 15. For every m0 : msg and set E of keys, if a fact F such that ρˆE(F ;m0) < ∞ occurs in a multiset of a
trace, then no rule fired later in the trace freshly generates m0.
Proof. If ρˆE(F ;m0) <∞, then at least one of the arguments to the predicate forming F must be a term built up from
m0 using symmetric encryption and concatenation. By the definition of freshness, if m0 is freshly generated by some
rule firing, no fact in any multiset earlier in the trace may be built up from m0.
Lemma 16. For every C,C ′ : client, T : TGS, set E of keys, and k : shK C T , no C level rule that C ′ fires decreases
E-corank relative to k.
Proof. Inspection of rules γ1.1, γ1.2, γ1.2′ , γ3.1, γ3.2, γ3.2′ , γ5.1, γ5.2, γ5.2′ , γ5′.1, and γ5′.2′ .
Lemma 17. For every C : client, T, T ′ : TGS, set E of keys, and k : shK C T , no C level rule that T ′ fires decreases
E-corank relative to k.
Proof. Inspection of rules γ4.1 and γ4.1′ .
Lemma 18. For every C : client, T : TGS, set E of keys, k : shK C T , and S : server, no C level rule that S fires
decreases E-corank relative to k.
Proof. Inspection of rules γ6.1, γ6.1′ , γ6′.1, and γ6′.1′ .
Lemma 19. For any nonempty set E of keys, C : client, T : TGS, C, T 6= I, key k′ : shK C T , and C level intruder
rule R, if R decreases E-corank relative to k′ then the left hand side of R includes I(k) for some k ∈ E or R freshly
generates k′.
Proof. Inspection of C level intruder rules.
B.2.3 Lemmas for Theorem 5
Lemma 20. For every T : TGS, k : dbK T , nonempty m0 : msg, and A level rule R which may be fired by C : client,
R does not increase k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rules α1.1, α1.2, α3.1, α3.2, α5.1, and α5.2.
Lemma 21. For every T : TGS, k : dbK T , nonempty m0 : msg, and A level rule R which may be fired by S : server,
R does not increase k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rule α6.1.
Lemma 22. For every T : TGS k : dbK T , nonempty m0 : msg and A level rule R which may be fired by T : TGS, R
does not increase k-rank relative to m0.
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Proof. Inspection of rule α4.1.
Lemma 23. For any key k, message m0, and A level intruder rule R, if R increases k-rank relative to m0, then the
left hand side of R includes I(k).
Proof. Inspection of A level intruder rules (and Axiom 1 in the case of MG).
Lemma 24. For C : client, T : TGS, k1 : shK C T , and k2 : dbK T , if K : KAS fires an A level rule which increases
k2-rank relative to k1, C, then that rule firing freshly generates k1 and creates the fact N(C, {k1, C}k2 , {k1, n, T}k3)for some n : nonce and k3 : dbK C.
Proof. Inspection of rule α2.1.
Lemma 25. For every m0 : msg and key k, if a fact F occurs in a trace and ρk(F ;m0) > 0, then no A level rule fired
later in the trace freshly generates k.
Proof. If k is freshly generated, then k does not appear in any previous multiset of the trace. Any fact F with positive
k-rank relative to some m0 must have as some argument a term constructed using encryption by k.
Lemma 26. For C : client, T : TGS, k : shK C T , m0 : msg, and K : KAS, K cannot fire an A level rule which
increases k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rule α2.1.
Lemma 27. For C : client, T, T ′ : TGS, k : shK C T , m0 : msg, and K : KAS, if T ′ fires an A level rule which
increases k-rank relative to m0, then m0 = kCS , n, S for some S : server, kCS : shK C S, and n : nonce.
Proof. Inspection of rule α4.1.
Lemma 28. For C : client, T : TGS, k : shK C T , m0 : msg, and S : server, S cannot fire an A level rule which
increases k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rule α6.1.
Lemma 29. For C,C ′ : client, T : TGS, k : shK C T , and m0 : msg, if C ′ fires a A level rule R which increases
k-rank relative to m0, then C ′ = C, m0 = C, R is α3.1 and creates the fact N(X, {C}AKey, C, S, n2) for some
X : msg, TOpts : TOpt, S : server, and n2 : nonce.
Proof. Rules α1.1, α1.2, α3.2, α5.1, and α5.2 can never increase k-rank relative to m0 for k : shK C T .
Rule α3.1, fired by C ′, produces the fact N(X, {C ′}AKey, C ′, S, n2) for some X : msg, S : server, n2 : nonce,
AKey : shK C T , and T : TGS. This has AKey-rank of 1 relative to C. The only other term which might have
positive AKey-rank relative to some m0 is X , but this contributes to the relative rank of the left side as well.
B.2.4 Lemmas for Theorem 6
Lemma 30. For every T : TGS, k : dbK T , nonempty m0 : msg, and C level rule R which may be fired by C : client,
R does not increase k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rules γ1.1, γ1.2, γ1.2′ , γ3.1, γ3.2, γ3.2′ , γ5.1, γ5.2, γ5.2′ , γ5′.1, and γ5′.2′ .
Lemma 31. For every T : TGS, k : dbK T , nonempty m0 : msg, and C level rule R which may be fired by S : server,
R does not increase k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rules γ6.1, γ6.1′ , γ6′.1, and γ6′.1′ .
Lemma 32. For every T : TGS k : dbK T , nonempty m0 : msg and C level rule R which may be fired by T : TGS,
R does not increase k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rules γ4.1 and γ4.1′ .
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Lemma 33. For any key k, message m0, and C level intruder rule R, if R increases k-rank relative to m0, then the
left hand side of R includes I(k).
Proof. Inspection of C level intruder rules.
Lemma 34. For C : client, T : TGS, k1 : shK C T , k2 : dbK T , and TF lags : TFlag, if K : KAS fires a C level
rule which increases k2-rank relative to TF lags, k1, C, then that rule firing freshly generates k1 and creates the fact
N(C, {TF lags, k1, C}k2 , {k1, n, TF lags, T}k3) for some n : nonce and k3 : dbK C.
Proof. Inspection of rules γ2.1 and γ2.1′ .
Lemma 35. For every m0 : msg and key k, if a fact F occurs in a trace and ρk(F ;m0) > 0, then no C level rule fired
later in the trace freshly generates k.
Proof. If k is freshly generated, then k does not appear in any previous multiset of the trace.
Lemma 36. For C : client, T : TGS, k : shK C T , m0 : msg, and K : KAS, K cannot fire a C level rule which
increases k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rules γ2.1 and γ2.1′ .
Lemma 37. For C : client, T, T ′ : TGS, k : shK C T , m0 : msg, and K : KAS, if T ′ fires a C level rule which
increases k-rank relative to m0 then m0 = kCS , n, SF lags, S for some S : server, kCS : shK C S, n : nonce, and
SF lags : SFlag.
Proof. Inspection of rules γ4.1 and γ4.1′ .
Lemma 38. For C : client, T : TGS, k : shK C T , m0 : msg, and S : server, S cannot fire a C level rule which
increases k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rules γ6.1, γ6.1′ , γ6′.1, and γ6′.1′ .
Lemma 39. For C,C ′ : client, T : TGS, k : shK C T , and m0 : msg, if C ′ fires a C level rule R which increases
k-rank relative to m0, then C ′ = C, m0 is either TOpts′, C, S′, n′2, e′′ or C, [TOpts′, C, S′, n′2, e′′]AKey, tC,Treq , R
is γ3.1 and creates the fact N(X, {C, [TOpts, C, S, n2, e]AKey, tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts, C, S, n2, e) for some X : msg,
TOpts : TOpt, S : server, n2 : nonce, and e : etype.
Proof. Rules γ1.1, γ1.2, γ1.2′ , γ3.2, γ3.2′ , γ5.1, γ5.2, γ5.2′ , γ5′.1, and γ5′.2′ can never increase k-rank relative to m0 for
k : shK C T .
Rule γ3.1, fired byC ′, produces the factN(X, {C ′, [TOpts, C ′, S, n2, e]AKey, tC,Treq}AKey, TOpts, C ′, S, n2, e)
for some X : msg, TOpts : TOpt, S : server, n2 : nonce, e : etype, AKey : shK C T , T : TGS, and tC,Treq : time.
This hasAKey-rank of 1 relative to each of the messages TOpts, C ′, S, n2, e andC ′, [TOpts, C ′, S, n2, e]AKey, tC,Treq .
The only other term which might have positiveAKey-rank relative to somem0 isX , but this contributes to the relative
rank of the left side as well.
B.3 Lemmas for Client/Server Exchange
B.3.1 Lemmas for Theorem 7
Lemma 40. For every C : client, S : server, k : shK C S, set E of keys, and T : TGS, if T fires an A level rule
which decreases E-corank relative to k, then the rule is rule α4.1 and its firing freshly generates k. Furthermore,
the only fact in the resulting multiset which is not in the previous multiset is N(C, {k,C}kS , {k, n, S}AKey) for some
kS : dbK S, AKey : shK C T , and n : nonce, and the {AKey, kS}-corank relative to k of the resulting multiset
equals 1.
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Proof. The only A level rule that an honest T : TGS may fire is α4.1. The only k : shK C S relative to which this
rule may decrease some E-corank is the key freshly generated by this rule. For some kS : dbK S, AKey : shK C T ,
and n : nonce, this rule firing produces the fact N(C, {k,C}kS , {k, n, S}AKey), which has {AKey, kS}-corank of 1
relative to k. This is the only fact on the right-hand side of rule α4.1, and thus the only fact in the multiset resulting
from this rule firing that was not in the previous multiset of the trace. As k is freshly generated by this rule firing, by
Lemma 9 no fact appearing earlier in the trace had finite {AKey, kS}-corank relative to k, so the {AKey, kS}-corank
relative to k of the multiset resulting from this rule firing equals the {AKey, kS}-corank relative to k of the new
network fact.
Lemma 41. For every K : KAS, C : client, S : server, set E of keys, and k : shK C S, no A level rule that K fires
decreases E-corank relative to k.
Proof. Inspection of rule α2.1.
Lemma 42. For every C,C ′ : client, S : server, set E of keys, and k : shKC S, no A level rule that C ′ fires decreases
E-corank relative to k.
Proof. Inspection of rules α1.1, α1.2, α3.1, α3.2, α5.1, and α5.2.
Lemma 43. For every C : client, set E of keys, S, S′ : server, and k : shK C S, no A level rule that S′ fires decreases
E-corank relative to k.
Proof. Inspection of rule α6.1.
B.3.2 Lemmas for Theorem 9
Lemma 44. For every S : server, k : dbKS, nonempty m0 : msg, no A level rule that C : client fires increases k-rank
relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rules α1.1, α1.2, α3.1, α3.2, α5.1, and α5.2.
Lemma 45. For every S : server, k : dbK S, nonempty m0 : msg, no A level rule that K : KAS fires increases k-rank
relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rule α2.1.
Lemma 46. For every S : server, k : dbK S, nonempty m0 : msg, no A level rule that S′ : server fires increases
k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rule α6.1.
Lemma 47. ForC : client, S : server, k1 : shKCS, k2 : dbKS, and T : TGS, if T fires an A level rule which increases
k2-rank relative to k1, C, then that rule is α4.1, and its firing consumes the fact N({k3, C}kT , {C}k3 , C, S, n), freshly
generates k1, and creates the fact N(C, {k1, C}k2 , {k1, n′, S}k3) for some k3 : shK C T , kT : dbK T , and n, n′ :
nonce.
Proof. Rule α4.1 is the only A level rule that an honest TGS may fire; the rest of the lemma follows by inspection of
this rule.
Lemma 48. For C : client, S : server, k : shK C S, m0 : msg, and K : KAS, K cannot fire an A level rule which
increases k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rule α2.1.
Lemma 49. For C : client, S : server, k : shK C S, m0 : msg, and T : TGS, T cannot fire an A level rule which
increases k-rank relative to m0.
Proof. Inspection of rule α4.1.
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Lemma 50. For C : client, S, S′ : server, k : shK C S, and m0 : msg, if S′ fires an A level rule which increases
k-rank relative to m0 then S′ = S and m0 = t for some t : time.
Proof. Inspection of rule α6.1.
Lemma 51. For C,C ′ : client, S : server, k : shK C S, and m0 : msg, if C ′ fires an A level rule which increases
k-rank relative to m0, then C ′ = C, m0 = C, t for some t : time, the rule is α3.1, and its firing creates the fact
N(Y, {C, t}k) for some Y : msg.
Proof. Rules α1.1, α1.2, α3.1, α3.2, and α5.2 can never increase k-rank relative to any m0 for k : shK C S.
Rule α5.1, fired by C ′, produces the fact N(Y, {C ′, t}k′) for some Y : msg, t : time, S′ : server, and k′ : shKC ′S′.
As Y also appears on the left hand side of this rule, whose firing increases k-rank relative to m0, it must be that the
k-rank of {C ′, t}k′ relative to m0 is greater than the k-rank relative to m0 of the left hand side of this rule. This term
has positive k-rank relative to m0 if and only if m0 = C ′, t and k = k′; considering the type of k = k′, we see that
C = C ′ and S = S′.
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C Anomalous Traces
In this appendix we give detailed traces for some of the anomalies discussed in Section 7. These include discussion of
the MSR rules which are fired in each trace; the message flows are as shown in Section 7.
C.1 A level trace of ticket anomaly
C,α1.1
−→
N(C, T, n1)
L(C, T, n1)
L(C, T, n1) N(C, T, n1)
K,α2.1
−→
N(C, {AKey,C}kT ,{AKey, n1, T}kC )
L(C, T, n1)
N(C, {AKey,C}kT ,{AKey, n1, T}kC )
I
−→
∃X : msg
I(C,X, {AKey, n1, T}kC )
I({AKey,C}kT )
L(C, T, n)
I({AKey,C}kT )
I(C,X, {AKey, n1, T}kC )
I
−→ N(C,X, {AKey, n1, T}kC )
I({AKey,C}kT )
N(C,X, {AKey, n1, T}kC )
L(C, T, n1)
C,α1.2
−→ AuthC(X,n1, T, AKey)
I({AKey,C}kT ) AuthC(X,n1, T, AKey)
C,α3.1
−→
N(X, {C}AKey, C, S, n2)
L(C, S, T, n2)
AuthC(X,n1, T, AKey)
AuthC(X,n1, T, AKey)
L(C, S, T, n2)
I({AKey,C}kT )
N(X, {C}AKey, C, S, n2)
I
−→ I(X, {C}AKey, C, S, n2)
AuthC(X,n1, T, AKey)
L(C, S, T, n2)
I(X, {C}AKey, C, S, n2)
I({AKey,C}kT )
I
−→
N({AKey,C}kT ,{C}AKey, C, S, n2)
AuthC(X,n1, T, AKey)
L(C, S, T, n2)
I(C,X, {AKey,C}kT )
N({AKey,C}kT ,{C}AKey, C, S, n2)
V alid(C, S, n2)
T, α4.1
−→
N(C, {SKey,C}kS ,{SKey, n2, S}AKey)
Figure 33: Producing anomalous behavior in the abstract formalization.
Figure 33 shows a sequence of rule firings which realize the ticket anomaly of Section 7.1. Arrows indicate the
firing of rules, with the labels above each arrow indicating the principal firing the rule and the rule being fired. In each
row, the rule being used rewrites the facts in the second column as those in the fourth; the facts in the first column
remain untouched by the rule in question.
C sends a request for credentials to K using the rule α1.1. K sees the network message C, T, n1 and replies
using rule α2.1, sending the network message C,TGT , {AKey, n1, T}kC where TGT = {AKey,C}kT is the ticket
granting ticket. The intruder I reads this message from the network using rule INT and creates a new message X using
MG. I then creates (using DMC, DMC, CMP, CMP) the message C,X, {AKey, n1, T}kC , i.e., K’s message with
the ticket TGT for T replaced by the freshly generated message X , and puts it on the network using TRN. C now
sees the network message C,X, {AKey, n1, T}kC , which is of the form she expects (she does not expect to be able
to read the ticket, and so cannot tell that it has been replaced by X). She thus completes the Authentication Service
Exchange by firing rule α1.2, storing X , n1, T , and AKey in the memory predicate AuthC .
Believing she has obtained credentials for T , C now initiates the Ticket Granting Exchange with T . She uses
the AuthC memory predicate to fire rule α3.1 and send the network message X, {C}AKey, S, n2. When I sees
this message on the network he removes the message from the network (INT). She then generates a new message
TGT , {C}AKey, S, n2 by replacing X with the original ticket TGT (DMC, CMP). I then puts this message onto
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the network (TRN). Finally, T sees the network message TGT , {C}AKey, S, n2 and uses this to fire the rule α4.1,
granting C’s apparent request for credentials for use with S.
C.2 C level trace of encryption type anomaly
Here we give a trace which realizes the encryption type anomaly sketched in Section 7.3. Recall that C knows
that the key kC : dbKe C has been compromised and attempts to request a ticket-granting ticket from K : KAS
using some other database key k′C : dbK
e′ C. C thus fires rule γ1.1, putting the message KOpts, C, T, n1, e′ on
the network. I already has possession of kC and e as indicated by the predicates I(kC) and I(e). Using rules INT,
DMC, CMP, and TRN, she intercepts C’s message and constructs the message KOpts, C, T, n1, e and then put this
message on the network. K sees this altered request as a legitimate KRB AS REQ message and fires rule γ2.1, placing
C,X, {AKey, n1, TF lags, T}ekC on the network, where X is the ticket granting ticket {TF lags,AKey,C}kT for
C to present to T . I intercepts this message using INT and then obtains AKey using DMC, SDC’, and DMC; an
additional application of DMC allows her to obtain the ticket-granting ticket. At this point, I has the ticket-granting
ticket and the session key AKey needed to use it, so she may impersonate C to the TGS T .
I(kC)
I(e)
C, γ1.1
−→
N(KOpts, C, T, n1, e
′)
L(C,KOpts, T, n1, e
′)
N(KOpts, C, T, n1, e
′)
I, INT
−→ I(KOpts, C, T, n1, e
′)
I(KOpts, C, T, n1, e
′)
I,DMC
−→
I(KOpts, C, T, n1)
I(e′)
I(KOpts, C, T, n1)
I(e)
I, CMP
−→ I(KOpts, C, T, n1, e)
I(KOpts, C, T, n1, e)
I, TRN
−→ N(KOpts, C, T, n1, e)
N(KOpts, C, T, n1, e)
V alidK(KOpts, C, T, n1, e)
SetAuthF lagsK(KOpts, C, T, TF lags)
SetETypesK(C, e, e, T, e
′′)
K, γ2.1
−→
N(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}e′′kT ,{AKey, n1, TF lags, T}ekC )
N(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}e′′kT , {AKey, n1, TF lags, T}ekC )
I, INT
−→
I(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}e′′kT ,{AKey, n1, TF lags, T}ekC )
I(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}e′′kT , {AKey, n1, TF lags, T}ekC )
I,DMC
−→
I(C, {TF lags,AKey,C}e′′kT )
I({AKey, n1, TF lags, T}ekC )
I({AKey, n1, TF lags, T}ekC )
I(kC)
I, SDC′
−→ I(AKey, n1, TF lags, T )
I(AKey, n1, TF lags, T )
I,DMC
−→ I(AKey)
Figure 34: Encryption Type Anomaly
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D Message Fields
This appendix consists of tables describing the correspondence between the message structures defined in [16] and the
network messages in our formalizations of Kerberos 5. Each table lists the field names (in typewriter type) as
given in Section 5 of [16], with subfields indented to indicate the level of nesting, and the corresponding names used
for the fields included in our formalizations. For those fields with subfields, the entry for the field shows the included
subfields as well as any encryption that is used; this provides some overlap with the entries for the subfields.
The KRB AS REQ message type is a message of type KRB KDC REQ, which is defined in Section 5.4.1 of [16].
The fields of this message are listed in Table 2.
Field Name A Level B Level C Level
pvno (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5
msg-type (omitted) KRB AS REQ (omitted) KRB AS REQ (omitted) KRB AS REQ
padata (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
req-body C, T, n1 C, T, n1 KOpts, C, T, n1, e
kdc-options (omitted) (omitted) KOpts
cname C C C
sname T T T
from (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
till (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
rtime (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
nonce n1 n1 n1
etype (omitted) (omitted) e
addresses (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
enc-authorization-data (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
additional-tickets (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Table 2: Fields in the KRB AS REQ message.
The KRB AS REP message type is a message of type KRB KDC REP, which is defined in Section 5.4.2 of [16].
Note that the structure of the ticket field is defined in Section 5.3.1 of [16]. The fields of this message are listed in
Table 3.
The KRB TGS REQ message type is a message of type KRB KDC REQ, which is defined in Section 5.4.1 of [16].
The fields of this message are listed in Table 4.
As noted in the description of padata under Section 5.4.1 of [16], “[r]equests for additional tickets (KRB TGS REQ)
must contain a padata of PA TGS REQ.” The description of PA-DATA in Section 5.2.7 of [16] seems to suggest that,
at least in this message, the checksum should be present and keyed. Section 5.2.7.1 of [16] notes that “[t]he checksum
in the authenticator (which must be collision-proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY encoding.” Thus we
take the cksum field to be a keyed checksum over the req-body field. It is important to note that this field does not
include the ticket, so the checksum will not be able to detect tampering with the ticket.
The padata field contains the authentication header, which is of type KRB AP REQ (as noted in the second
paragraph under section 3.3 and the first paragraph of 5.5.1 in [16]). The subfields of this message type are listed
directly as subfields of padata. These include the ticket, whose constituent subfields are not listed (see Table 3)
since it is unreadable by the client, and the freshly constructed authenticator, whose subfields are listed. A
full description of authenticators is given in section 5.3.2 of [16]. The cksum field of the authenticator “contains
a checksum of the application data that accompanies the KRB AP REQ” (under the description of cksum in 5.3.2
of [16]), i.e., that accompanies the authentication header.
The KRB TGS REP message type is a message of type KRB KDC REP, which is defined in Section 5.4.2 of [16],
and as such parallels the structure of the KRB AS REP message given above. The fields of this message are listed in
Table 3. We do not show the effects of an anonymous ticket (in which the ANONYMOUS flag in the ticket is set);
this would change the cname from C to a generic client name.
The fields of the KRB AP REQ message are shown in Table 6. This message has the same structure as the authen-
tication header of the KRB TGS REQ message above. The cksum field in the authenticator is described as optional
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Field Name A Level B Level C Level
pvno (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5
msg-type (omitted) KRB AS REP (omitted) KRB AS REP (omitted) KRB AS REP
padata (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
crealm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
cname C C C
ticket {AKey,C}kT {AKey,C, tK,auth, tK,end}kT {TF lags,AKey,C}kT
tkt-vno (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5
realm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
sname (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
enc-part {AKey,C}kT {AKey,C, tK,auth, tK,end}kT {TF lags,AKey,C}kT
flags (omitted) (omitted) TF lags
key AKey AKey AKey
crealm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
cname C C C
transited (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
authtime (omitted) tK,auth (omitted)
starttime (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
endtime (omitted) tK,end (omitted)
renew-till (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
caddr (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
authorization-data (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
enc-part {AKey, n1, T}kC {AKey, n1, tK,auth, tK,end, T}kC {AKey, n1, TF lags, T}kC
key AKey AKey AKey
last-req (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
nonce n1 n1 n1
key-expiration (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
flags (omitted) (omitted) TF lags
authtime (omitted) tK,auth (omitted)
starttime (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
endtime (omitted) tK,end (omitted)
renew-till (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
srealm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
sname T T T
caddr (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Table 3: Included fields for the KRB AS REP message.
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Field Name A Level B Level C Level
pvno (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5
msg-type (omitted) KRB TGS REQ (omitted) KRB TGS REQ (omitted) KRB TGS REQ
padata {AKey,C}kT {AKey,C, {TF lags,AKey,C}kT{C}AKey tK,auth, tK,end}kT {C, [req-body]AKey,
{C, tC,Treq}AKey tC,Treq}AKey
pvno (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
msg-type (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
ap-options (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
ticket {AKey,C}kT {AKey,C, {TF lags,AKey,C}kT
tK,auth, tK,end}kT
authenticator {C}AKey {C, tC,Treq}AKey {C, [req-body]AKey,
tC,Treq}AKey
authenticator-vno (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
crealm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
cname C C C
cksum (omitted) (omitted) H(req-body)
cusec (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
ctime (omitted) tC,Treq tC,Treq tC,Treq
subkey (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
seq-number (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
authorization-data (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
req-body C, S, n2 C, S, n2 TOpts, C, S, n2, e
kdc-options (omitted) (omitted) TOpts
cname C C C
sname S S S
from (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
till (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
rtime (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
nonce n2 n2 n2
etype (omitted) (omitted) e
addresses (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
enc-authorization-data (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
additional-tickets (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Table 4: Fields in the KRB TGS REQ message.
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Field Name A Level B Level C Level
pvno (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5
msg-type (omitted) KRB TGS REP (omitted) KRB TGS REP (omitted) KRB TGS REP
padata (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
crealm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
cname C C C
ticket {SKey,C}kS {SKey,C, tT,auth, tT,end}kS {SF lags, SKey,C}kS
tkt-vno (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
realm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
sname (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
enc-part {SKey,C}kS {SKey,C, tT,auth, tT,end}kS {SF lags, SKey,C}kS
flags (omitted) (omitted) SF lags
key SKey SKey SKey
crealm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
cname C C C
transited (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
authtime (omitted) tT,auth (omitted)
starttime (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
endtime (omitted) tT,end (omitted)
renew-till (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
caddr (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
authorization-data (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
enc-part {SKey, n2, S}AKey {SKey, n2, tT,auth, tT,end, S}AKey {SKey, n2, SF lags, S}AKey
key SKey SKey SKey
last-req (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
nonce n2 n2 n2
key-expiration (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
flags (omitted) (omitted) SF lags
authtime (omitted) tT,auth (omitted)
starttime (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
endtime (omitted) tT,end (omitted)
renew-till (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
srealm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
sname S S S
caddr (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Table 5: Included fields for the KRB TGS REP message.
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and application specific in the first paragraph under Section 3.2.2 of [16].
Field Name A Level B Level C Level
pvno (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5
msg-type (omitted) KRB AP REQ (omitted) KRB AP REQ (omitted) KRB AP REQ
ap-options (omitted) (omitted) SOpts
reserved (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 0|1
use-session-key (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 0|1
mutual-required (omitted) 0|1 0|1
reserved (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 0| . . . |229 − 1
ticket {SKey,C}kS {SKey,C, tT,auth, tT,end}kS {SF lags, SKey,C}kS
authenticator {C, tC,Sreq}SKey {C, tC,Sreq}SKey {C, []SKey, tC,Sreq}SKey
authenticator-vno (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
crealm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
cname C C C
cksum (omitted) (omitted) H(· · · )
cusec (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
ctime tC,Sreq tC,Sreq tC,Sreq
subkey (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
seq-number (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
authorization-data (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Table 6: Fields in the KRB AP REQ message.
The structure of the KRB AP REP message, which S sends to C when mutual authentication has been requested,
is shown in Table 7.
Field Name A Level B Level C Level
pvno (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5
msg-type (omitted) KRB AP REP (omitted) KRB AP REP (omitted) KRB AP REP
enc-part {tC,Sreq}SKey {tC,Sreq}SKey {tC,Sreq}SKey
ctime tC,Sreq tC,Sreq tC,Sreq
cusec (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
subkey (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
seq-number (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Table 7: Fields in the KRB AP REP message.
Finally, the structure of the KRB ERROR messages is shown in Table 8. Error messages are not implemented in
the A level formalization.
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Field Name A Level B Level C Level
pvno (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5 (omitted) 5
msg-type (omitted) KRB ERROR KRB ERROR KRB ERROR
ctime (omitted) −− |tC,Treq|tC,Sreq −− |tC,Treq|tC,Sreq −− |tC,Treq|tC,Sreq
cusec (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
stime (omitted) t(K|T |S),err t(K|T |S),err t(K|T |S),err
susec (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
error-code (omitted) ErrorCode ErrorCode ErrorCode
crealm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
cname (omitted) C (omitted) C (omitted) C
realm (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
sname (omitted) K|T |S K|T |S K|T |S
e-text (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
e-data (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Table 8: Fields in the KRB ERR message.
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